Beyond the Guild: Lawyer Organizations and Law Making by Levin, Leslie C. & Mather, Lynn
Washington University Global Studies Law Review 
Volume 18 Issue 3 
2019 
Beyond the Guild: Lawyer Organizations and Law Making 
Leslie C. Levin 
University of Connecticut School of Law 
Lynn Mather 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, International Law Commons, Law and Politics 
Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Profession Commons, and the Organizations Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leslie C. Levin and Lynn Mather, Beyond the Guild: Lawyer Organizations and Law Making, 18 WASH. U. 
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 589 (2019), 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/8 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Global Studies Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
589 
BEYOND THE GUILD: 
LAWYER ORGANIZATIONS 
AND LAW MAKING 
LESLIE C. LEVIN* AND LYNN MATHER** 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 589 
I. THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONS, THE LEGAL PROFESSION, 
AND LAWMAKING ................................................................................ 594 
A. Organization Theories ............................................................. 595 
1. Internal Aspects of Organizations.................................. 595 
 2. Organizations and the State .......................................... 596 
3. Globalization of Law and Organizations ....................... 601 
B. Theories of Legal Professions .................................................. 602 
1. Functionalism ............................................................... 602 
2. Market Control ............................................................. 603 
3. Client Interests .............................................................. 604 
4. Political Liberalism....................................................... 605 
II. OVERVIEW OF SEVEN COUNTRIES ................................................ 606 
A. Democracies ........................................................................... 609 
1. United States ................................................................. 609 
2. Brazil ............................................................................ 612 
3. Japan ............................................................................ 614 
4. Israel ............................................................................ 616 
B. Transitional Governments........................................................ 618 
1. Kyrgyzstan .................................................................... 618 
2. Libya............................................................................. 620 
C. Authoritarian Government - China .......................................... 622 
III. FROM OCCUPATIONAL CONCERNS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ACTIVITIES BY LAWYER ORGANIZATIONS .................................... 624 
A. Working for Issues Affecting the Legal Profession as an 
 
 
*  Joel Barlow Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. The authors are 
grateful to the following for their helpful suggestions and comments: Richard Abel, Asel 
Djamankulova, Ole Hammerslev, Kyoko Ishida, Kelly McMann, Ethan Michelson, Fabio de Sa e 
Silva, Ulrike Schultz, Hilary Sommerlad, Richard Winters, John Van Maanen, and Limor Zer-Gutman. 
They also thank Omar Badawi, Keith George, and Azamat Kerimbaev for providing invaluable 
information. Any errors are our own. 
**  SUNY Distinguished Service Professor Emerita, University at Buffalo School of Law and 
Affiliate Professor of Justice Studies, University of New Hampshire. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
 
 
 
 
 
 
590 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 18:589 
 
 
 
 
Occupation ........................................................................... 624 
1. Self-regulation .............................................................. 624 
2. Controlling Size and Quality of the Profession .............. 627 
3. Defining, Expanding and Defending the Market ............ 629 
4. Self Defense .................................................................. 633 
B.  Acting on Issues to Benefit Clients (but also Sometimes 
Benefitting Lawyers) .................................................................... 635 
C.  Issues Directly Affecting Courts and the Administration of  
Justice.  ..................................................................................... 639 
1. Improving and Protecting the Judicial System ............... 639 
2. Access to Justice ........................................................... 643 
D. Acting to Advance Human Rights or to Address Other Issues 
Affecting Civil Society .................................................................. 650 
IV. WHEN AND WHY DO LAWYER ORGANIZATIONS ACT TO 
INFLUENCE LAW? ................................................................................ 654 
CONCLUSION  ..................................................................................... 661 
INTRODUCTION 
Lawyers throughout the world seek to influence law, not only through 
their individual actions, but also through lawyer organizations. As interest 
groups, these organizations often work to affect not only law, but also the 
justice system and the workings of government. It is no secret that these 
organizations sometimes try to block legal change or create new legal 
rules to promote lawyers’ own interests.1 Lawyer organizations also work 
to influence law in ways that will benefit their clients. Yet sometimes 
lawyers’ collective actions reflect broader political concerns rather than 
their clients’ or their own self-interest, such as when thousands of 
Pakistani lawyers took to the streets in 2007 to protest General Pervez 
Musharraf’s attempt to remove the Supreme Court Chief Justice for 
political reasons.2 In contrast, the German Bar Association did little to 
 
 
1  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. POWELL, FROM PATRICIAN TO PROFESSIONAL ELITE: THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION 5 (1988). 
2 The first protests occurred in March 2007. Declan Walsh, Pakistan Lawyers Clash with 
Police over Judge’s Sacking, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 12, 2007), 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/mar/12/pakistan.declanwalsh. Later that year, thousands of 
lawyers participated in protests organized by bar organizations around the country. Pamela Constable, 
Pakistan’s Lawyers on the Front Lines, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2007), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/11/18/AR2007111801338.html; Simon 
Gardner, Pakistan Lawyers Strike to Protest Musharraf Purge, REUTERS (Dec. 5, 2007), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-lawyers-idUSISL28295920071205; Jane Perlez & David 
Rohde, Pakistan Attempts to Crush Protest by Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2007), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/world/asia/06pakistan.html. 
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oppose Nazi efforts in 1933 to take over the bar association and to remove 
Jewish judges from the judiciary.3 What explains attempts by lawyer 
organizations to affect law? In what situations and for what reasons do 
they do so? 
Lawyer guilds began to appear around 1100, and like other guilds, 
engaged in activities to promote their members’ status and to secure a 
monopoly on the work they performed.4 In Florence, a guild of judge-
lawyers and notaries (Arte dei Giudici e Notai) was a “vigorous 
organization” by 1212.5 In England, lawyer societies formed in the Inns of 
Court and the Inns of Chancery in the fourteenth century.6 The French 
Order of Advocates was first constituted in the mid-fourteenth century.7 In 
the early seventeenth century, French barristers acted collectively to 
oppose the Crown’s and high courts’ efforts to tax honoraria paid to 
barristers by their clients.8 By the early eighteenth century, the Order was 
actively engaged in political action in opposition to both the Church and 
the state.9  
Today, lawyer organizations exist in nearly every country.10 
 
 
3  INGO MULLER, HITLER’S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD REICH 61-62 (1992); Kenneth 
F. Ledford, Lawyers and the Limits of Liberalism: The German Bar in the Weimer Republic, in 
LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA FROM 
THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES 229, 230-31 (Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik eds., 
1997).  
4  JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, THE MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 365 (2008). 
There were arguably guilds of law in Baghdad and elsewhere in the Muslim world even earlier. See 
George Makdisi, The Guilds of Law in Medieval Legal History: An Inquiry into the Origins of the Inns 
of Court, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 3, 4, 6 (1985).   
5  LAURO MARTINES, LAWYERS AND STATECRAFT IN RENAISSANCE FLORENCE 11, 14 (2015); 
Jonathan Rose, The Legal Profession in Medieval England: A History of Regulation, 48 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 1, 90 (1998). 
6  BRUNDAGE, supra note 4, at 368; Rose, supra note 5, at 90; Introduction, INNER TEMPLE 
LIBR., https://www.innertemplelibrary.org.uk/inner-temple/history/introduction/ (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019). 
7  See BRUNDAGE, supra note 4, at 368; Pierre Georges LePaulle, Law Practice in France, 50 
COLUM. L. REV. 945, 945 (1950). 
8  David A. Bell, Barristers, Politics, and the Failure of Civil Society in Old Regime France, in 
LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 65, 71. 
9  Id. at 74-80; Terence C. Halliday & Lucien Karpik, Politics Matter: A Comparative Theory 
of Lawyers in the Making of Political Liberalism, in LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM, supra note 3, at 15, 24. 
10  Lawyer organizations can be found in war-torn countries such as Syria, and in countries 
operating under authoritarian rule such as China. See DAMASCAS B. ASS’N, www.damascusbar.org 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019); ZHONGGUO LÜSHIWANG (中國律師網)[ALL CHINA LAW. ASS’N], 
http://www.acla.org.cn/home/toPage (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). Lawyer organizations can also be 
found in countries with relatively few lawyers. See, e.g., Francesca Bartlett, A Professional Project in 
the South Pacific: Regionalism and Reforming Solomon Islands’ Legal Profession, 42 FORDHAM INT’L 
L.J. 14, 18 (2018). The terms “lawyer organization” and “bar association” are used interchangeably in 
this article. 
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Comparative analysis of “lawyer” organizations is challenging, however, 
because countries organize legal work quite differently.11 The term 
“lawyer” is used in this Article to mean legally trained individuals who are 
licensed to represent clients in the country’s criminal courts and in most 
civil court matters.12 So, for example, in the United States this would refer 
to lawyers, in Japan to bengoshi, and in France to avocats (and not 
notaires).13 Most nations have mandatory organizations to which all 
lawyers must belong. Governments typically enact legislation establishing 
these mandatory organizations, but then afford them some autonomy.14 
This includes the right to elect leaders and to exercise some responsibility 
for the regulation of lawyer conduct.15 In some countries, however, the 
organization’s leadership is essentially chosen by the state and lawyers are 
constrained in their efforts to pursue collective goals through the 
organization. 
Many countries also have voluntary lawyer organizations to which 
lawyers may choose to belong. Voluntary lawyer organizations are 
typically composed of lawyers who work in the same geographic area 
(e.g., the Los Angeles County Bar Association), practice setting (e.g., the 
Association of Corporate Counsel), or specialty (e.g., the National 
 
 
11  As Richard Abel noted, the concept of “lawyer” is a unitary one, based in the common law 
world, with private practice at its core. However, there is no “legal profession” as such in the civil law 
world, which includes other legal occupational categories such as civil servants, judges, prosecutors, 
and law professors in addition to private practitioners. See Richard L. Abel, Lawyers in the Civil Law 
World, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 1, 4 (Richard L. Abel & Philip C. Lewis 
eds., 1988). Japan has five other types of legal services providers besides attorneys (bengoshi), 
including some whose work is similar to the work of U.S. lawyers (e.g., patent attorneys, tax 
accountants, and judicial scriveners). See Kyoto Ishida, Ethical Standards of Japanese Lawyers: 
Translation of the Ethics Codes for Six Categories of Legal Service Providers, 14 PAC. RIM L. & 
POL’Y 383, 383 (2005). 
12  In countries like Russia and Kyrgyzstan, only criminal defense lawyers are licensed. 
Unlicensed individuals can appear in a representational capacity in civil matters. See infra notes 183-
85 and accompanying text; Chris Johnson, Is Reform Coming to the Russian Legal Market?, AM. LAW. 
(July 28, 2017), https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/1202793478216/.  
13  We acknowledge that the definition of lawyer used here generally reflects that of common 
law jurisdictions. Our analysis in this article focuses on organizations of “lawyers” as previously 
defined. We exclude organizations composed exclusively of judges, prosecutors, or other government 
lawyers who, after obtaining their law degrees, are trained separately in many civil law jurisdictions 
and often belong to different professional associations. 
14  This approach is promoted by the United Nations Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, 
which state that lawyers “shall be entitled to form and join self-governing professional associations to 
represent their interests.” Eighth U.N. Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, art. 24, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.144/28/Rev.1 (Aug. 27, 
1990) [hereinafter U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers]. 
15  This is also promoted in the U.N. Basic Principles. See id. (stating that that the executive 
body of lawyers’ associations “shall be elected by its members and shall exercise its functions without 
external interference”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/8
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Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers). There are also voluntary 
lawyer organizations composed of lawyers who share an affinity based, 
inter alia, on gender, sexual preference, ethnicity, or religion.16 Voluntary 
lawyer organizations are also formed so that like-minded lawyers can 
pursue common political goals or human rights issues.17   
International and transnational lawyer organizations, such as the 
International Bar Association, the Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe, and the International Commission of Jurists also play a significant 
role in influencing the law.18 These organizations work to preserve lawyer 
independence, to advance their economic interests, and to support national 
and local lawyer organizations. Some of these international organizations 
affect law by facilitating the creation of consistent commercial practices.19 
They often also work to devise standards concerning lawyer conduct and 
consistent cross-border rules of practice.20 These organizations further 
seek to influence the law in post-conflict countries and emerging 
democracies by providing technical assistance to lawyer organizations and 
governments that produces new constitutions and new laws, including the 
laws governing lawyers.21 
This Article examines when and why lawyer organizations seek to 
influence law, either by promoting change or opposing it. The Article 
compares the activities of lawyer organizations in specific countries, 
noting at times how they work in conjunction with international or 
 
 
16  In the United States, examples include the Women’s Bar Association, the National LGBT 
Bar Association, the Hispanic National Bar Association, and the Catholic Bar Association. 
17  Examples include the Republican National Lawyers Association and the National Lawyers 
Guild. See About the RNLA, REPUBLICAN NAT’L LAW. ASS’N, https://www.rnla.org/about-rnla/ (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019) (stating that association “builds the Republican Party goals and ideals through a 
nationwide network of supportive lawyers who understand and directly support Republican policy, 
agendas and candidates”); About, NAT’L LAW. GUILD, https://www.nlg.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 
12, 2019) (stating that its mission is to use law “as an effective force in the service of the people by 
valuing human rights over property interests”).  
18  The International Bar Association, founded in 1947, has a membership of more than 100,000 
individual lawyers and about 200 bar associations and law societies. Leslie Levin, Lynn Mather & 
Leny de Groot-van Leeuwen, The Impact of International Lawyer Organizations on Lawyer 
Regulation, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 407, 413 (2018). The Council of Bars and Law Societies of 
Europe, formed in 1960, represents forty-five European bars and law societies. Who We Are, CCBE, 
http://www.ccbe.eu/about/who-we-are/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). The International Commission of 
Jurists, formed in 1952, includes judges and lawyers from around the world. About, ICJ, 
https://www.icj.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).   
19  See, e.g., Susan Block-Lieb & Terence C. Halliday, Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in 
Global Commercial Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 75, 79-80 (Terence C. Halliday & 
Gregory Shaffer eds. 2015). 
20  See Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen, supra note 18, at 409, 416-17, 423-24, 436-
437. 
21  Id. at 409, 429, 432-33. 
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regional lawyer organizations. It seeks to identify the factors that enable 
the organizations to act and the conditions that may prevent them from 
acting, focusing not on outcomes, but on attempts to affect law. These 
efforts include, for example, proposing, drafting or responding to rules or 
legislation, lobbying, filing lawsuits or amicus briefs, and engaging in 
strikes or other public protest. Examining the full range of lawyers’ 
efforts, we also include “pre-law making” activities such as problem 
definition, agenda setting, and mobilization for change, as well as 
implementation activities focused on enforcement or resistance. Because 
of governmental impediments to action by lawyer organizations in some 
jurisdictions, we also consider informal efforts by lawyers to engage in 
collective actions.  
Part I of this Article describes organizational theories and theories of 
the legal profession that might explain why lawyer organizations attempt 
to influence law. In Part II, the Article provides an overview of lawyers 
and their organizations in seven countries with very different political and 
legal systems. As an initial study of this issue, the small number of 
countries provides an opportunity to explore the question in some depth.22 
Part II briefly describes the history of lawyers and their associations in 
these countries, their relationship to the courts and the state, and their view 
of their role in society. Part III then examines some situations in which 
lawyer organizations acted to influence law and other situations in which 
they stayed silent. Using examples from the seven countries, this Part 
identifies four somewhat overlapping categories in which lawyer 
organizations attempted to affect the law. Part IV revisits the theoretical 
perspectives to suggest when lawyer organizations will act, and when they 
will not. The Article concludes by identifying questions for further 
research. 
I. THEORIES OF ORGANIZATIONS, THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION, AND LAWMAKING 
Why might lawyer associations seek to influence law? At least two 
general bodies of theory suggest some possible answers.23 First, lawyer 
 
 
22  The countries were selected because of their key political and legal differences, but the small 
number limits our ability to generalize about lawyer organizations in all countries. This study makes 
descriptive inferences about recent attempts by lawyer organizations in those countries to influence 
law based on interviews and published observations of activities in those countries. For discussion of 
descriptive inferences versus causal inferences, see Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 29-31 (2002).  
23  Other possibly relevant theories include those on interest group advocacy, occupational 
groups, and voluntary associations.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol18/iss3/8
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associations are organizations, social groups designed to achieve a 
common goal, and thus organizational analysis offers useful concepts and 
hypotheses for explaining advocacy by organized groups. Second, theories 
of the legal profession should also be considered, since lawyer 
organizations–unlike other organizations such as unions or producers–
have their own special connection to law and the state. The general 
theories of organizations are echoed in the legal profession theories. 
 A. Organization Theories 
Some of the older theories of organizations provide frameworks for 
understanding them at the micro level, focusing on internal characteristics 
such as formal structure, management, or culture. These theories, designed 
for industrial organizations, help explain why organizations making 
widgets succeed or fail, but they are far less useful for explaining the 
relation between organizations and the state. Moreover, their focus on 
internal concerns tends to ignore how organizations operate in society as 
they compete for “limited resources such as membership, capital, and 
legitimacy.”24 By contrast, macro-level theories shed more light on 
organization-state relations since they focus on environmental forces 
influencing and constituting organizations, including their relations with 
political elites and other groups.25 These theories call attention to the role 
of organizations in society, the impact of the state and transnational orders 
on organizations, and the benefits that organizations can obtain through 
advocacy. 
 1. Internal Aspects of Organizations  
Despite the limits of micro-level organization theories for 
understanding lawyer organizations and lawmaking, two internal aspects 
of organizations deserve brief mention. First, the degree to which 
organizations are hierarchical or participatory in their decision making 
may influence their actions. Hierarchical decision-making structures allow 
more freedom for leaders to follow their own instincts, personal ambitions, 
or political ideologies. Participatory structures, on the other hand, may 
limit leaders’ decisions and actions. Even though members in participatory 
 
 
24  MICHAEL T. HANNAN & JOHN FREEMAN, ORGANIZATIONAL ECOLOGY 13 (1989). 
25  See, e.g., W. RICHARD SCOTT, INSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 114-15 (1995). On the 
distinction between micro and macro-level theories of organizations, see David Lowery, Why Do 
Organized Interests Lobby? A Multi-Goal, Multi-Context Theory of Lobbying, 39 POLITY 29, 30-31 
(2007). 
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organizations typically pay little attention to leadership decisions (unless 
on matters of direct import to them), there is always the possibility of 
challenge if leaders go too far. According to Robert Michel’s classic “iron 
law of oligarchy,” this scenario is unlikely: over time, he argues, all 
complex organizations evolve into oligarchies due to bureaucracy and 
specialization.26 Thus, even the most democratic organizations will tend to 
be controlled by a small elite.  
Second, the nature of organizational membership affects the range of 
actions leaders can pursue. In voluntary organizations, members who 
disagree with leaders’ decisions can leave and join another organization 
that better represents their preferences, which may constrain leaders 
concerned with retaining members. But with mandatory membership, 
leaders have more freedom to act. Nevertheless, such actions must 
typically relate to the work of the organization in some way and not be 
overtly political lest the organization lose credibility with its members. 
Trade unions or professional associations with mandatory membership 
may have additional rules (either self-imposed or legally required) that 
restrict organizations from lobbying on certain issues.27 
  2. Organizations and the State 
Although there is a wide range of organization theories in different 
disciplines (management, sociology, political science, economics, etc.), 
this section focuses on only three macro-level approaches to help 
understand the relation between organizations and the state: rational actor 
(utility maximizing) theory, environmental ecology, and new 
institutionalism. Borrowing ideas from economics, rational actor theory 
suggests that organizations seek to influence state policies for instrumental 
reasons, typically in order to advance the interests of their members.28 That 
is, organizations seek to obtain benefits, secure favorable regulations, 
control entry to the market or the occupation, or deter competitors. As 
economist George Stigler argued, industry (or an occupation) seeks 
government regulation primarily for its own benefit, not for the benefit of 
 
 
26  ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL 
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 61-65 (1962). But see J. Craig Jenkins, Non-Profit 
Organizations and Policy Advocacy, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK 296, 306 
(Walter W. Powell ed., 1987) (noting that the iron law of oligarchy is not ironclad where advocacy 
organizations remain small, rotate leadership, and are strongly committed to participatory values).  
27  See infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
28  See SCOTT, supra note 25, at 27-28; Lowery, supra note 25, at 31-33. 
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the general public or for purely political reasons.29 Further, producer 
interests are more likely to invest in political action than are consumer 
interests due to producers’ narrow focus on their own products or income, 
in contrast to consumers’ more varied areas of concern.30 
Mancur Olson notes, however, when collective benefits become 
available to all members of an organization, regardless of individual 
contributions, members may rationally decide to become free riders and 
take advantage of the benefits without actively contributing to them.31 For 
example, when management increases employee wages, they all receive 
the raise whether or not they belong to the union that negotiated it. One 
solution to this problem is to make organizational membership 
compulsory, as in a closed union shop. In the absence of compulsory 
membership, organizations offer different types of incentives to attract 
individual members and avoid free riders.32 These incentives may be 
material (tangible monetary rewards or economic opportunities), solidary 
(prestige, sociability, and status of belonging to the organization), or 
purposive (benefits from identification with a common purpose or goal).33 
This theory suggests that professional associations either seek to make 
membership mandatory or offer such incentives to overcome the collective 
action problem. 
Larry Ribstein poses the question: why do lawyers devote time to 
lawmaking?34 Not only do lawyers have an interest in the efficiency of law 
and the necessary expertise to work on law, he suggests, but lawyer 
associations–like other groups–can use their engagement with the state to 
overcome collective action problems. That is, “[l]awyers as a group 
acquire an aura of professionalism from lawmaking.”35 That “aura of 
 
 
29  George J. Stigler, A Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3, 13 
(1971). 
30  For empirical support for this from studies of lobbying organizations in the United States, see 
FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER ET AL., LOBBYING AND POLICY CHANGE: WHO WINS, WHO LOSES, AND 
WHY 9 (2009); KAY LEHMAN SCHLOZMAN & JOHN T. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 22 (1986). A problem with this theory, however, lies in the fact that empirical 
studies have not demonstrated the effectiveness of lobbying on behalf of narrow producer interests. If 
lobbying is ineffective or uncertain, why would rational actors continue with it? See Lowery, supra 
note 25, at 34-35.  
31  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION, PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF 
GROUPS 14-16 (1965). 
32  Id. at 51. 
33  Peter B. Clark & James Q. Wilson, Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations, ADMIN. 
SCI. Q. 129, 134-36 (1961). 
34  Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers As Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 
299, 329 (2004). 
35  Id. 
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professionalism” provides a solidary incentive for members to identify 
with bar associations. Other values promoted by their engagement with 
lawmaking include professional legitimacy and credibility. For example, 
when the issue of multi-disciplinary practice (MDP) arose in the United 
States,36 lawyer organizations actively opposed it in part to protect their 
market share, which was threatened by accounting firms. 37 Nevertheless, 
other crucial intangibles influenced the organizations’ positions. The 
conflict over MDP involved “struggles to define the contours of 
professional legitimacy – to define the social image that the legal 
profession will seek to project.”38 By opposing MDPs on grounds of legal 
ethics, lawyer organizations could uphold the professional image of the 
lawyer as one worthy of “professional reward and respect.”39  
A second macro-theory, environmental (or population) ecology, 
focuses less on the policy benefits to be gained from lobbying, and more 
on organizational adaptation and survival. Groups compete with one 
another in a constantly changing environment, and advocacy activity can 
help organizations maintain or increase their membership.40 Indeed, 
empirical studies of why organizations lobby suggest they do so not only 
to influence public policy but also to maintain the organization.41 When 
organizations need to secure support from allies in a coalition or thwart the 
opposition, the environment in which they operate becomes crucial for 
their actions. An ecological approach borrows from environmental niche 
theory42 or from Darwinian evolutionary theory43 to emphasize an 
organization’s environment and its changes over time, and to explain 
group activity through adaptation. Choosing when to attempt to influence 
law may depend on whether government or institutions “allow or impede 
access, the public opinion context in which debates takes place, and which 
other organized interests are also lobbying the issue.”44 Considering these 
 
 
36  MDP is a partnership or other association of lawyers with nonlawyers (typically other 
professionals) that has, as one of its purposes, the delivery of legal services. 
37  Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, The Confrontation between the Big Five and Big Law: 
Turf Battles and Ethical Debates as Contests for Professional Credibility, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 
615, 616 (2004). 
38  Id. at 617. 
39  Id. 
40  Lowery, supra note 25, at 30-31. See also HANNAN & FREEMAN, supra note 24, at 13-15. 
41  William P. Browne, Organizational Maintenance: The Internal Operation of Interest 
Groups, 37 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 48, 50 (1977); Rorie Spill Solberg & Eric N. Waltenburg, Why Do 
Interest Groups Engage the Judiciary? Policy Wishes and Structural Needs, 87 SOC. SCI. Q. 558, 569 
(2006). 
42  Lowery, supra note 25, at 47-49. 
43  HANNAN & FREEMAN, supra note 24, at 10-15. 
44  Lowery, supra note 25, at 43. 
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contextual factors–uncertain, socially determined, and not always 
instrumental–David Lowery argues that the most fundamental goal of an 
organization is to survive as an organization and that all other goals are 
secondary.45 Organizational survival thus may help explain why and when 
organized interests mobilize to seek legal change or preserve the status 
quo. That is, lawyer organizations may seek to ensure the profession’s 
survival against threats from competitors or from the state itself. 
Finally, new institutionalism offers a third perspective for 
understanding organizations and the state, particularly two broad camps of 
new institutionalism: historic and sociological.46 These institutional 
approaches question the assumption of rational pursuit of a group’s 
interests, and focus instead on the importance of historical development 
and shared cultural values of groups in society. But unlike the theories 
above, which consider organizations to be autonomous, historic 
institutionalism and sociological institutionalism view all organizations as 
deeply embedded in a larger structure. That is, “organizations are local 
instantiations of wider institutions . . . [i]nstitutions, understood as taken-
for-granted beliefs, rules, and norms.”47 These beliefs, rules and norms 
may be regulative (such as required by law), normative (enforced by 
shared values), or cognitive (mental models for understanding behavior).48  
Historical institutionalism examines how norms and values change 
over time and how the past shapes the content of a group’s interests and 
identity. For example, lawyer associations in post-colonial countries may 
relate to the state through the prism of their history with the colonial 
government. This has sometimes led to lawyer organizations taking strong 
positions of independence against the state. Historic institutionalism also 
draws on Arthur Stinchcombe’s insights about the importance of the social 
and political conditions present at the time that an organization was 
founded and how these “imprinting” effects may persist over time.49 
 
 
45  Id. at 46-47, 53. Lowery draws on environmental ecology and resource dependence theory to 
expand on the theory of organizational survival. Id. at 47-52. 
46  A third camp, rational choice, is not discussed here. Rational choice shares the assumptions 
of rational actor theory, but adds an emphasis on “how structural arrangements affect the strategic 
calculations of participants.” Howard Gillman & Cornell Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: 
Institutional Approaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: 
NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1, 6 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). For 
elaboration on the three strands of new institutionalism, see id. at 5-7; SCOTT, supra note 25, at 24-32; 
Thomas A. Koelble, The New Institutionalism in Political Science and Sociology, 27 COMP. POL. 231, 
232-41 (1995). 
47  Olivier Berthod, Institutional Theory of Organizations, in GLOBAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC POLICY, AND GOVERNANCE 1 (Ali Farazmand ed., 2016). 
48  Id. at 2; SCOTT, supra note 25, at 33. 
49  Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Social Structures and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF 
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Moreover, historical institutionalism “provides us with the notion of 
‘critical junctures,’ key ‘moments’ or periods in the history of any 
institution” that can explain how “organizations see, act, and think of 
themselves.”50 
Sociological (or ethnographic) institutionalism focuses on how wider 
cognitive and normative structures in society affect every aspect of an 
organization, incorporating symbolic systems into the organization, and 
constituting it through tacitly understood rules.51 Whether through 
affiliation with particular ideological groups, ethnic, religious, or racial 
identification, or family groups, organizations may support or oppose the 
state in particular ways because of their cultural context. Some of these 
commonalities also become important when analyzing an organizational 
sector, a group of organizations supplying a similar service or product.52 
Consider, as examples, the health care sector or the software industry. 
Another example is the legal sector, which may include lawyer 
organizations, law firms, judges, prosecutors, and other legal officials. 
Sectors possess strong social and cultural linkages, horizontally across 
organizations, and vertically with respect to administrative rules and the 
state. Thus, how an organization’s leaders relate to and think about 
government may depend in part on the institutional culture in that sector.    
The state itself presents a higher-level institutional form beyond an 
institutional sector, including commonly understood frameworks of 
policymaking that affect how and when organizations can influence law. 
States differ in how policies are made, the relation between law and 
politics, and the activities considered to be government responsibilities, 
rather than private responsibilities. Thus, states vary in the benefits that 
can be obtained by lawyer associations through political action. The 
United States also sits as an outlier, with its cultural assumptions of 
liberal/individualism and strong civil society groups actively competing 
 
 
ORGANIZATIONS 142, 143-44, 153-60 (James G. March ed., 1965); see also SCOTT, supra note 25, at 
115. 
50  Kieran McEvoy & Rachel Rebouche, Mobilizing the Professions: Lawyers, Politics, and the 
Collective Legal Conscience, in JUDGES, TRANSITION, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 275, 278 (John Morison et 
al. eds., 2007).  
51  SCOTT, supra note 25, at 29-31.  
52  W. Richard Scott & John W. Meyer, The Organization of Societal Sectors, in 
ORGANIZATIONAL ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY 137 (John W. Meyer & W. Richard 
Scott eds., 1983). See also Paul DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN 
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS 63, 64-65 (Walter W. Powell & Paul DiMaggio eds., 1991) (describing 
“organizational fields” as “key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and 
other organizations that produce similar services or products”). 
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for advantage from a relatively passive state.53 Thus, rational actor theory 
fits better at describing the proactive lobbying strategies of interest groups 
in the United States than it does for organizations working within 
authoritarian or corporatist states, where private individuals and groups 
have less ability to influence public policies.54 
 3. Globalization of Law and Organizations 
In the twenty-first century, organizational theory must be expanded to 
place organization-state relations within a broader global context. 
Globalization has created a new legal field in which private and public 
organizations exert influence and defend their turf. National professional 
associations increasingly look to their own international professional 
associations to influence law affecting the professions at the national and 
transnational level.55 Julia Evetts shows, for example, how professional 
associations in European countries (e.g., associations of engineers) have 
attempted to influence EU law through several different strategies.56 
Moreover, through consultation, debate, lobbying, and networking at 
international levels, international professional organizations are affecting 
professional licensing, training and regulation, areas that were once the 
sole purview of the nation-states.57 As James Faulconbridge and Daniel 
Muzio put it, globalization has created a situation in which the national 
actors formerly assumed to be powerful regulators of the professions 
“have to learn to coexist with equally powerful and effective supranational 
actors.”58 Consequently, professional organizations may seek to influence 
law at both the national and international levels. 
Consider, for example, how organizations respond to a need for global 
conformity to new procedures or offer solutions to global problems. 
 
 
53  See, e.g., Terence C. Halliday, Legal Professions and the State: Neocorporatist Variations on 
the Pluralist Theme of Liberal Democracies, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: COMPARATIVE THEORIES 375, 
376 (1989); Ronald L. Jepperson & John W. Meyer, The Public Order and the Construction of Formal 
Organizations, in THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS, supra note 52, at 
220-25.  
54  Lowery, supra note 25, at 30-31, 52.  
55  See Julia Evetts, International Professional Associations: The New Context for Professional 
Projects, 9 WORK, EMP. & SOC’Y 763, 764 (1995) (noting that “international professional associations 
have become more influential (more authoritative) than nation state governments, in influencing EU 
directives, as well as global agreements, on professions and professional services”). 
56  Id. at 770.  
57  Julia Evetts, Professionalism Beyond the Nation-State: International Systems of Professional 
Regulation in Europe, 18 INT’L J. SOC. & SOC. POL’Y 47, 60 (1998). 
58  James R. Faulconbridge & Daniel Muzio, Professions in a Globalizing World: Toward a 
Transnational Sociology of the Professions, 27 INT’L SOC. 136, 137 (2011). 
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Organizations may need to work with similar groups in other countries and 
also with global organizations. National actors and lawyer professional 
groups, for example, created new transnational institutions for dispute 
settlement in the development of international arbitration,59 and have also 
constructed new transnational legal categories and norms. The concept of 
“international crime,” for instance, emerged as a legal category through a 
dialectical process in which demands from national political actors 
initiated global debate that led to a new legal framework for articulating 
such claims and new institutional mechanisms for adjudicating them.60 
Globalization not only creates new transnational legal orders, but it 
also affects the practices and values of local and national organizations in 
lawmaking. Gregory Shaffer describes how intermediaries including 
government representatives, professional service providers, academics, 
and NGOs are the “carriers, conduits, and points of entry for the 
circulation of transnational legal norms” back to the national and local 
context.61 When this occurs, organizations may seek legal change in their 
own countries to conform to transnational standards. Local and national 
organizations may also engage in advocacy due to their participation in 
international organizations, their collaboration with organizations from 
other countries, or their receipt of financial or technical assistance from 
other groups. As a result of these experiences, organizations can expand 
their work into new areas, learn new methods of doing business, name 
problems they had not previously diagnosed, and acquire strategies for 
addressing them, all prompting them to seek changes in the law.62 
 B. Theories of Legal Professions  
  1. Functionalism  
A classic theory of the professions posits that they will use their 
 
 
59  See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 6-7 
(1996); Florian Grisel, Competition and Cooperation in International Commercial Arbitration: The 
Birth of a Transnational Legal Profession, 51 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 790, 794 (2017). 
60  Anne Holthoefer, Constructing International Crime: Lawyers, States, and the Origin of 
International Criminal Prosecution in the Interwar Period, 42 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 711, 736, 738-
739 (2017) (describing legal initiatives between World War I and II that form “the legal genealogy of 
the International Criminal Court”). 
61  Gregory Shaffer, The Dimensions and Determinants of State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL 
LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 23, 41-42 (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013). 
62  For examples with respect to the impact of international lawyer organizations on the 
regulation of the legal profession, see Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen, supra note 18, at 436-
449, 453-65. 
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independence and expertise for the general good.63 For Emile Durkheim 
and other structural functionalists, the professions offered one antidote to 
the selfish materialism otherwise found in a society composed of egoistic 
individuals.64 This structural functionalist view of the mid-twentieth 
century, articulated especially by Talcott Parsons, elevated lawyers and 
saw them as powerful political actors with a degree of moral superiority 
who can play a major stabilizing role in society.65 According to this view, 
independence permits professionals to pursue a broad, collective 
orientation rather than any narrow, special interests, imbuing them with 
moral superiority and legitimacy.66 As Richard Abel notes, “if structural 
functionalism had to distinguish professions by means of a single 
characteristic, self-regulation would be the prime candidate.”67 The 
arguments for professional self-regulation rest on the ideas that only 
fellow professionals have the necessary expertise to judge professional 
performance and on the importance of the profession’s independence from 
the state.68 Although functionalism has been largely displaced by other 
theories,69 the ideology behind it resonates in lawyers’ codes of conduct 
and in other bar rhetoric. It may also explain the profession’s attempt to 
influence law to maintain self-regulation. 
 2. Market Control 
This theory of the professions takes a rational actor perspective and 
sees them as powerful groups that seek to influence law for self-interested 
reasons such as maintaining their professional power and advancing their 
collective social mobility. Magali Larson describes the professional 
project as an effort to attain market monopoly, social status, and work 
autonomy.70 Andrew Abbott develops the concept of jurisdiction to link 
professional power with expertise and market control; groups compete for 
 
 
63  RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 35 (1989); John P. Heinz, The Power of Lawyers, 
17 GA. L. REV. 891, 892 (1983). 
64  ABEL, supra note 63, at 16. 
65  Talcott Parsons, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL 
THEORY 370, 378-82, 384-85 (Talcott Parsons ed., 1964); Robert K. Merton, The Functions of the 
Professional Association, 58 AM. J. NURSING 50, 53 (1958). 
66  Heinz, supra note 63, at 893. 
67  ABEL, supra note 63, at 37. 
68  Id. 
69  For a critique of the usefulness of structural functionalism as an explanatory theory, see 
ABEL, supra note 63, at 232-37.  
70  MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 49 
(1977); see also ABEL, supra note 63, at 158. 
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jurisdiction over areas of work and persuade governments and the public 
that they have the special competence and expertise to do this work.71 
Examples of the legal professions’ attempts to exert market control 
include efforts to restrict entry to the profession through overly rigorous 
bar admission requirements. Lawyer organizations also seek to protect 
lawyers’ turf by resisting non-lawyer incursions into activities that lawyers 
perform.  
 3. Client Interests  
Lawyer organizations may also act to influence the law to benefit their 
clients. Of course, such efforts can also benefit lawyers, because they can 
make lawyers’ work more predictable or more remunerative, and may 
enhance their perceived value to their clients. It is important to note, 
however, that these motivations may not be conscious, but rather due to 
lawyers’ “close identification with, and sharing in, [clients’] interests,”72 a 
perspective that draws on sociological institutionalism.73 Michael Powell 
notes that “[a]lthough lawyers may leave their immediate clients at the 
door of the bar association committee room, they are unable to leave 
behind the common culture and values they share with clients in 
general.”74 Likewise, when asking large firm lawyers how they would 
change the law if they could do so, Robert Nelson found not much 
disparity between client concerns and the lawyers’ agenda for change in 
the legal fields in which they actually practice.”75 As he notes, “[s]ince 
lawyers come to adopt the positions of the corporate clients whom they 
represent, it is unlikely that their law reform activities will depart to any 
significant extent from the positions that they advocate for their clients.”76 
In some cases, however, lawyers’ identification with client interests can 
reduce the ability of a lawyer organization to engage in meaningful 
collective action due to the diversity of clients that the organization’s 
membership represents.77   
 
 
71  ANDREW ABBOTT, THE SYSTEM OF PROFESSIONS: AN ESSAY ON THE DIVISION OF EXPERT 
LABOR 59-69, 134-142 (1988). Abbott’s focus on competition among professional groups for 
jurisdiction over work parallels the emphasis on organizational survival in organizational ecology 
theory. Both perspectives view groups in competition for resources within a wider environment. 
72  POWELL, supra note 1, at 241. 
73  See supra Part I.A.2. 
74  POWELL, supra note 1, at 241. 
75  Robert L. Nelson, Ideology, Practice and Professional Autonomy: Social Values and Client 
Relationships in the Large Law Firm, 37 STAN. L. REV. 503, 525 (1985). 
76  Id. at 527. 
77 See POWELL, supra note 1, at 180, 220; Heinz, supra note 63, at 908; Quintin Johnstone, Bar 
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 4. Political Liberalism 
Finally, historical institutionalism has been applied to the legal 
profession to explain the reasons for and nature of political advocacy by 
lawyer organizations. Terence Halliday, in his study of the Chicago Bar 
Association, argues that as states develop and as legal professions become 
more secure vis-à-vis the state and acquire more resources, professional 
associations engage in political activities beyond those of market control.78 
Instead of “a vulnerable occupation” dependent on “an empowering state” 
(and thus seeking favors from the state to advance themselves), as 
professions become more established they are themselves empowered and 
the state may be weaker, facing political and structural crises.79 Halliday 
suggests that “[t]he established legal profession, no longer absorbed with 
monopoly and its maintenance,” has the potential to commit its expertise 
to the democratic state and to assume more responsibility for liberal 
democratic government.80 At this stage, “the established profession is less 
occupationally vulnerable, less reflexively self-protective and self-
preoccupied, and less collectively narcissistic.”81 Lawyers therefore may 
be willing and able to contribute their expertise to a state that is 
struggling.82 Powell notes that sometimes professions “actually precipitate 
state action by drawing attention to areas” in which change is needed.83 
Why would they do this? One reason is the bar’s collective value 
commitments to the legitimacy of the law as an institution and to 
procedural justice.84 
When comparing U.S. bar activities to those in other Western 
countries, Halliday and Lucian Karpik expand on these ideas to include 
political activities of lawyer organizations working in opposition to the 
state.85 They suggest how the history of the bar, the relative autonomy of 
judges and courts in different countries, and the emphasis placed on 
 
 
Associations: Policies and Performance, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 193, 231-32 (1996); Jerry Van 
Hoy, Intraprofessional Politics and Professional Regulation: A Case Study of the ABA Commission on 
Professionalism, 20 WORK & OCCUPATIONS 90, 106-07 (1993). 
78  TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, BEYOND MONOPOLY: LAWYERS, STATE CRISES, AND 
PROFESSIONAL EMPOWERMENT 346-47 (1987).  
79  Id. at 347, 353. 
80  Id. at 347. 
81  Id. at 353. 
82  Id. See also Powell’s discussion of “civic professionalism” in his study of the New York City 
Bar Association. POWELL, supra note 1, at 247-50. 
83  POWELL, supra note 1, at 248.  
84  Id. at 246, 249-50. 
85  Halliday & Karpik, supra note 9, at 26, 56. 
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economic interests versus political goals influence the likelihood that 
lawyers will engage in collective action to advance political liberalism. In 
a later work, Halliday, Karpik and Malcolm Feeley examine lawyers in 
countries such as Chile, China, Israel, and Japan to test “the proposition 
that lawyers are active agents in the construction of liberal political 
regimes.”86 By “liberal political regimes,” they mean those that embrace 
individual legal freedoms with a moderate state, an independent judiciary, 
and an autonomous civil society. Sometimes legal professions mobilize to 
defend political liberalism, but in other situations or countries, they are 
constrained from defending it or are openly hostile to it.  
Scholars such as Stuart Scheingold and Austin Sarat have observed that 
activist or “cause” lawyers are often at the forefront of efforts to promote 
individual rights and liberal political regimes.87 Cause lawyers are 
motivated not by money or status but by an interest in social change, as 
they seek to advance social justice and the interests of those without 
power.88 Karpik discusses “political lawyers” who fight for political 
liberalism but distinguishes them from “cause lawyers.”89 Regardless of 
the label, these activist lawyers can sometimes move lawyer organizations 
to lobby or otherwise work toward legal change. 
II. OVERVIEW OF SEVEN COUNTRIES  
In view of these perspectives, when and why might we expect to see 
efforts by lawyer organizations to influence the law? Even when looking 
at a single country, it can be difficult to answer these questions. Cross-
country comparisons add to the complexity. The history, politics, status, 
and role of lawyers in each country differ. So, too, does the composition of 
lawyer organizations and the relations between the lawyer organization 
 
 
86  Terence C. Halliday et al., The Legal Complex and Struggles for Political Liberalism, in 
FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM: COMPARATIVE STUDIES OF THE LEGAL COMPLEX AND POLITICAL 
LIBERALISM 1, 2 (Terence C. Halliday et al. eds., 2007). 
87  See STUART A. SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, 
PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004); CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A 
GLOBAL ERA (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL 
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); 
THE WORLDS CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE: STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN LEGAL PRACTICE (Austin Sarat 
& Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005).  
88  In most of their work, Sarat and Scheingold restrict cause lawyering to progressive or liberal 
causes, but others have suggested that concept can and should be broadened. Thomas M. Hilbink, You 
Know the Type. . . : Categories of Cause Lawyering, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 657 (2004).  
89  Lucien Karpik, Political Lawyers, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 86, at 
463, 491-92 (noting that political lawyers and cause lawyers are both “committed activists,” but they 
differ in resources, construction of judicial issues and relations with the bar).  
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and the state. 
 In order to consider a wide range of factors, we focus on lawyer 
organizations in seven countries: Brazil, China, Israel, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Libya, and the United States. There are obvious limitations associated with 
the country selections. For example, while we consider some civil law 
countries, we have not included a European country in this analysis. One 
country in Africa—Libya—is included, but it is predominantly Arab and 
Berber, and therefore different than many other African countries. 
Nevertheless, the countries selected are of different sizes, in different 
regions, and represent different legal systems (civil, common law). They 
also represent different political systems (democracies, transitional 
governments, authoritarian regimes), and to some extent, different 
attitudes toward the lawyer’s role in civil society. The strength of the 
lawyer organizations in these countries, their relationship to the state, and 
their ability to mobilize also vary significantly. They do, however, share 
some common features. Lawyers in all seven countries (except in some 
U.S. jurisdictions) must belong to a mandatory lawyer organization. Most 
of these countries also have voluntary lawyer organizations through which 
lawyers seek to influence law. Some of the characteristics of the countries 
and their major lawyer organizations are described below. 
OVERVIEW OF COUNTRIES AND BAR ORGANIZATIONS  
 Population 
(in 
millions)90 
Number 
of 
lawyers91 
Legal 
system92 
Type of 
government 
Major bar 
organization/ 
date 
 
 
90 United Nations Dep’t of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Population Div., World Population 
Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables tbl.1 (Working Paper No. ESA 
P/WP/248, 2017), https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/publications/Files/WPP2017_KeyFindings.pdf. 
91  The number of “lawyers” indicated in this column reflects the members of each lawyer 
organization, except for the United States. The number of U.S. lawyers reflects the total number 
licensed to practice law in all U.S. jurisdictions. The numbers reflect estimates in some cases. For the 
sources consulted, listed in alphabetical order by country, see Institucional/Quadro de Advogados 
[Institutional/Attorneys’ Framework], OAB, 
http://www.oab.org.br/institucionalconselhofederal/quadroadvogados (last visited Mar. 12, 2019); 
China Has More Than 365,000 Lawyers, XINHUANET (July 2, 2018), 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-07/02/c_137296471.htm; E-mail from Amit Pearlman, Israel 
Bar Ass’n, to Leslie C. Levin (Jan. 2, 2019, 03:46 EST) (on file with authors); What Is the JFBA?, 
JAPAN FED’N B. ASS’NS, https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/us/profile.html (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019); Telephone Interview with Azamat Kerimbaev, ABA ROLI Country Director, Kyrgyzstan (June 
20, 2017); ILAC, ILAC RULE OF LAW ASSESSMENT REPORT: LIBYA 2013, at 63 (May 9, 2013), 
http://www.ilacnet.org/blog/2013/05/09/ilac-assessment-report-libya-2013/; AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA 
NATIONAL LAWYER POPULATION SURVEY: LAWYER POPULATION BY STATE (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/market_research/National_Lawyer_Pop
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formed/type 
Brazil 209.3 1.19 
million 
Civil law Federal 
presidential 
republic 
OAB – 1930 
mandatory 
China 1,409 365,000 Civil law Communist ACLA – 1986 
mandatory 
Israel 8.3 75,000 Primarily  
common 
law 
Parliamentary 
democracy 
IBA – 1961 
mandatory 
 
 
 Population 
(in 
millions) 
Number 
of 
lawyers 
Legal 
system 
Type of 
government 
Major bar 
organization/ 
date 
formed/type 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
6 2300 Civil 
law/post 
Soviet 
Parliamentary 
republic/post-
Soviet 
transition 
Advokatura – 
2014 
mandatory 
 
Libya 6.4 4000 Civil law/ 
Islamic 
law 
In transition LBA – 1962 
mandatory 
United 
States 
324.5 1.34 
million 
Common 
law 
Federal 
constitutional 
republic 
ABA - 1878 
voluntary (+ 
mandatory bar 
orgs. in 32 states 
& D.C.) 
 
This section begins with countries with established democracies (the 
United States, Brazil, Japan, and Israel). Even within this group, the 
lawyer organizations differ greatly. The United States has no single 
mandatory national lawyer organization. In Israel and the United States, 
prosecutors belong to lawyer organizations, while in Brazil and Japan, 
they do not. As will be seen, the lawyer organizations also have different 
structures, different levels of political engagement, and different powers 
and roles vis-à-vis the judiciary and the state. 
The discussion then turns to countries in transition, followed by those 
with autocratic regimes. Kyrgyzstan, as in other countries in Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia, has some leaders working to establish a more 
democratic government and judicial system after years of Soviet 
 
 
ulation_by_State_2018.authcheckdam.pdf.  
92  The information in this column and the next column comes from the Central Intelligence 
Agency’s The World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.  
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domination. Libya continues to experience armed conflict, but its legal 
profession has attempted to return to a more independent profession after 
years of domination by Muammar Qaddafi’s regime. In China, lawyers 
work in an autocratic regime and are required to belong to a state-
controlled lawyer organization. Again, these lawyer organizations are 
quite different from one another in their composition, histories, and ability 
to seek changes in the law. 
To provide an overview of the lawyer organizations in the seven 
countries, this section briefly describes the country’s legal system, the 
history of the legal profession, and the relationship between its lawyers 
and the state. It also describes the major lawyer organizations in each 
country. This information provides context for the discussion in Part III. 
 A. Democracies 
 1. United States  
The United States is an example of an established legal profession in a 
democratic common law country. A few voluntary lawyer organizations 
first appeared in colonial America in the eighteenth century,93 and others 
emerged in the early-to-mid nineteenth century,94 but did not survive. In 
the 1870s, elite bar organizations with exclusive memberships began to 
appear, including the Association of the Bar of the City of New York 
(1870), the Chicago Bar Association (1874), and the American Bar 
Association (1878).95 These exclusive organizations formed due to 
concern about political and judicial corruption and a desire to improve the 
standing of the legal profession.96 Some voluntary lawyer associations 
later emerged because the elite bar organizations would not admit certain 
lawyers due to race, ethnicity, or immigrant status, or were not meeting the 
needs of non-elite lawyers.97  
 
 
93  From 1744-70, New York had a lawyers’ association that was organized “for the purpose of 
resistance to the encroachment of the British Crown in the exercise of the King’s prerogative.” 
Marvelle Webber, Origin and Uses of Bar Associations, 7 ABA J. 297, 297 (1921). The Suffolk 
County Bar Association was formed in Massachusetts in the mid-1770s. See HALLIDAY, supra note 
78, at 60; Margaret H. Marshall, John Adams: Lawyer, Absentee Chief Justice, and the Author of the 
Massachusetts Constitution, 10 MASS. LEGAL HIST. 27, 33-34 (2004).  
94  A lawyers’ organization was formed in Philadelphia in 1802. Meredith Hanna, The 
Organized Bar in Philadelphia, 25 TEMP. L.Q. 301, 301 (1951); see also ROSCOE POUND, THE 
LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 15-16 (1953) (describing other bar associations).  
95  HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 64, 67. 
96  See id. at 64, 67; POWELL, supra note 1, at 6, 9. 
97For example, the Negro Bar Association, later known as the National Bar Association, was 
incorporated in 1925 after some of its founders were denied membership in the ABA. History, NAT’L 
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The organized bar in the United States has enjoyed a close relationship 
with the courts, which assume primary responsibility for regulating 
lawyers, but often delegates some of that authority to state bar 
organizations. Today, U.S. lawyers must be admitted to practice in one of 
the fifty states or the District of Columbia. Lawyers are required to join 
their state bar organization (known as a mandatory or unified bar) in 
thirty-two states and the District of Columbia.98 Mandatory bars include 
practicing lawyers, judges, and non-practicing lawyers who wish to retain 
their law licenses. In the other jurisdictions lawyers are licensed by the 
state, but are not required to belong to a lawyer organization.99 There are 
also hundreds of voluntary lawyer associations in the United States. 
Lawyers, judges, and law students sometimes belong to the same 
voluntary lawyer organizations.100 Some of the voluntary organizations 
actively engage in law reform and lobbying efforts, including the almost 
400,000-member American Bar Association (ABA) and the National 
Lawyers Guild.101 Other voluntary lawyer organizations focus mainly on 
lawyer education, business networking, social exchange, and mutual 
support.102  
In the United States, mandatory state bar organizations often play a 
major role in lawmaking on issues affecting lawyers and the 
administration of justice. But their ability to act in other legal spheres has 
been limited by case law and rules that prevent the expenditure of 
compulsory bar dues on political activity not related to the legal 
profession, administration of justice, or improving the quality of legal 
 
 
B. ASS’N, https://www.nationalbar.org/NBA/History.aspx (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). See also About 
NYCLA , N.Y. COUNTY LAW. ASS’N, 
http://www.nycla.org/NYCLA/About/Overview/NYCLA/About/AboutNYCLA.aspx? (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2019) (noting that the strongest factor contributing to its founding was that “the only existing 
bar association in Manhattan precluded some lawyers from membership by virtue of ethnicity, 
religion, gender and race”).  
98 See About Us, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019). The National Lawyers Guild was formed in 1937 to promote human rights and social justice. 
NAT’L LAW. GUILD, https://www.nlg.org/about/history/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
99 For example, the New Jersey State Bar Association is a voluntary bar organization. See N.J. 
State Bar Ass’n Bylaws, Art. IV. New Jersey lawyers are admitted to practice pursuant to a process 
administered by the New Jersey Board of Bar Examiners and their annual registration is administered 
by the New Jersey courts. See N.J. Rules Governing Courts 1:27-1 (2018).  
100 Judges and prosecutors may also belong to their own specialty associations. The National 
District Attorneys Association, the Association of Prosecuting Attorneys, and the American Judges 
Association are examples of such voluntary specialty organizations. 
101 See About Us, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019). The National Lawyers Guild was formed in 1937 to promote human rights and social justice. 
NAT’L LAW. GUILD, https://www.nlg.org/about/history/ (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).   
102 See, e.g., HELLENIC LAW. ASS’N, http://www.helleniclawyersassociation.org/. 
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services.103 Voluntary lawyer organizations, on the other hand, can work to 
influence the law on a broader range of issues. For example, specialty bar 
organizations like the American Association for Justice (the plaintiffs’ 
personal injury bar) engage in lobbying efforts to protect individuals’ 
rights to obtain adequate compensation in the courts.104 The ABA issues 
statements and resolutions, files amicus briefs, and writes letters to 
Congress and other officials on issues affecting lawyer regulation, the 
substantive law, the administration of justice, and political, social, and 
human rights.105 The New York City Bar Association has spoken out on 
matters such as the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement 
and the use of targeted drone strikes.106   
As the largest U.S. bar association, the ABA merits some additional 
discussion. Although an elite organization for much of its history, it now 
actively seeks to attract lawyers in all substantive areas of the law and 
practice settings. Its members include U.S. lawyers, law students, non-
U.S. legal professionals, and non-lawyers.107 The ABA’s approximately 
600-member House of Delegates—which includes elected representatives 
from all the state bars—has responsibility for establishing formal ABA 
policy on professional and public issues.108 The House of Delegates elects 
the officers of the ABA, including the president who serves for a one-year 
term.109  
 
 
103 See Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1990) (holding that attorneys who 
belong to mandatory bar have First Amendment right not to pay dues that are used to subsidize the 
organization’s political and ideological activities); Ariz. Sup. Ct. R. 32 (c) (8) (2018) (member who 
objects to particular State Bar lobbying activities may request refund of portion of annual dues 
allocable to those activities); Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar 2-9.3(c) (2018) (same); N.H. Bar Ass’n 
Const. art. I (limiting the activities of the mandatory bar “to those matters which are related directly to 
the administration of justice; the composition and operation of the courts; the practice of law and the 
legal profession”). 
104 See, e.g., Advocacy, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., https://www.justice.org/membership/advocacy 
(last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
105 See, e.g., Advocacy & Initiatives, A.B.A., https://www.americanbar.org/advocacy.html (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
106 New York City Bar Association Statement on Withdrawal from Paris Climate Agreement, 
N.Y.C. B (June 2, 2017), http://www.nycbar.org/media-listing/media/detail/new-york-city-bar-
association-statement-on-withdrawal-from-paris-climate-agreement; N.Y.C. BAR, THE LEGALITY 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW OF TARGETED KILLINGS BY DRONES LAUNCHED BY THE UNITED 
STATES, App. D (2014), https://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072625-
TheLegalityofTargetedInternationalKillingsbyUS-LaunchedDrones.pdf.  
107 Membership FAQ, A.B.A. (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/membership/faq.html. 
108 AM. BAR ASS’N, POLICY AND PROCEDURES HANDBOOK 2018-2019, at 3, 9 (2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/board_of_governors/2018_2019_policy_
and_procedures_handbook.pdf. 
109 Id. at 3, 22. 
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 2. Brazil 
Brazil provides an example of a post-colonial legal profession in a civil 
law democracy. Brazil declared its independence from Portugal in 1822.110 
According to Joaquim Falcão, “independence meant the rejection of 
absolutism and the adoption of liberalism and constitutionalism—initially 
monarchical and subsequently republican—as the national ideology.”111 
The elite Institute of Brazilian Lawyers (IAB), founded in 1843, regularly 
advised the government about legislation and helped draft the first 
republican constitution.112 Its members’ conception of professionalism 
centered on “jurisprudential expertise as a specific way of influencing the 
state and society.”113 The Order of Attorneys of Brazil (OAB), to which all 
Brazilian lawyers (advogados) must belong, was created in 1930 by 
Getulio Vargas’s government.114 After Vargas seized emergency power in 
1937, and shut down Congress and imposed a new authoritarian 
constitution, the OAB “took the lead of social and political criticism, 
claiming to be a voice for public interest, in defense of the juridical order 
and the rule of law.”115 The OAB initially hesitated to act following the 
military coup in 1964, but a few years after the regime rewrote the 
constitution and suspended Congress, the OAB and IAB began criticizing 
the regime and defending human rights and the rule of law.116 The OAB 
campaigned for a new constitutional convention to replace the military and 
eventually became an influential lobbyist and drafter in connection with 
the 1988 Constitution, which restored democracy to Brazil.117 
 
 
110 Joaquim Falcão, Lawyers in Brazil, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD, supra 
note 11, at 400, 400.  
111 Id. at 401. 
112 Maria da Gloria Bonelli, Lawyers’ Associations and the Brazilian State, 1843-1997, 28 LAW 
& SOC. INQUIRY 1045, 1052 (2003); História da Instituição, IAB, 
iabnacional.org.br/institucional/historia-da-instituicao (last visited Jan. 24, 2019).  
113 Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1051.  Nevertheless, in 1895, with the advent of the Republic, the 
IAB adopted a practice of neutrality, which included not making declarations on purely political 
issues. Id. at 1057. 
114 Id. at 1045, 1048, 1059-60; Falcão, supra note 110, at 422-23. It was only after the OAB was 
formed that the practice of law was limited to those registered with the OAB. Falcão, supra, at 417. 
115 Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1061.  
116 MARIA HELENA MOREIRA ALVES, STATE AND OPPOSITION IN MILITARY BRAZIL 149, 157, 
160-62 (1985); Eliane Botelho Junqueira, The Brazilian Bar Association in the Struggle for Human 
Rights, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE AROUND THE WORLD: LEGAL EDUCATION, LEGAL PRACTICE, AND 
THE COMMUNITY 158, 160 (Louise G. Trubek & Jeremy Cooper eds. 1999); Bonelli, supra note 112, at 
1064-65. The OAB initially expressed approval of the new regime because it felt there was a need to 
establish civil order, but it subsequently shifted positions. Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1063-64. 
117 MATTHEW M. TAYLOR, JUDGING POLICY: COURTS AND POLICY REFORM IN DEMOCRATIC 
BRAZIL 109, 113-14 (2008).  
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At that time, lawyers were viewed as the defenders of public liberties 
and human rights, and this conferred “great moral authority on OAB in the 
eyes of the government and civil society.”118 According to Maria da Gloria 
Bonelli, “the defense of the juridical order has been at the core of lawyers’ 
collective identity, maintaining group cohesion and the public legitimacy 
of the OAB.”119 The OAB also works to protect the market for private 
practitioners.120  Nevertheless, defense of the Constitution remains “a 
principal ideational motivator.”121   
Today, the OAB consists of more than one million lawyers and law 
interns.122 It plays a central role in regulating the profession.123 The OAB 
has twenty-seven sectional councils, one for each state or territory.124 
Much of its important regulatory and political decision making occurs in 
its eighty-one member Federal Council, which includes three councilors 
from each of the twenty-seven states.125 The Federal Council elects the 
president for three-year terms.126  
The OAB directly influences law primarily through public statements 
and litigation.127 It has the power under the Constitution to file challenges 
to the constitutionality of actions by the federal government using the 
 
 
118 Falcão, supra note 110, at 425.  
119 Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1047. 
120 See Junqueira, supra note 116, at 164; Fabio de Sa e Silva, Doing Well and Doing Good in an 
Emerging Economy: The Social Organization of Pro Bono among Corporate Lawyers and Law Firms 
in São Paulo, Brazil, in THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE 
RISE OF THE CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETY 210, 224 n.17 
(Luciana Gross Cunha et al. eds., 2018).  
121 TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 110. 
122 There are approximately 1.19 million lawyers and 29,000 student interns. 
Institucional/Quadro de Advogados, supra note 91. The OAB estimates that thirty percent of lawyers 
do not practice law. Maria da Gloria Bonelli & Pedro Fortes, The Transformation of the Brazilian 
Legal Profession: Fragmentary Development, Democratisation, and Globalisation of Lawyers in 
Brazil, in LAWYERS IN 21ST CENTURY SOCIETIES: NATIONAL REPORTS (Richard L. Abel & Ole 
Hammerslev eds., forthcoming 2019).  
123 The OAB establishes the ethical code for lawyers, administers the bar examination, and 
investigates discipline complaints. Lei No. 8.906, de 4 de Julho de 1994, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO 
[D.O.U.] de 5.7.94; TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 115. Nevertheless, the legal profession is not solely 
controlled by the OAB. The bar exam, for example, is regularly modified in response to political 
pressures, judicial challenges and legislative proposals. Bonelli & Fortes, supra note 122.  
124 Frederico de Almeida & Paulo André Nassar, Ordem dos Advogados do Brazil and the 
Politics of Professional Regulation in Brazil, in THE BRAZILIAN LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF 
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 120, at 181, 195.  
125 See TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 116; Almeida & Nassar, supra note 124, at 195; Bonelli, 
supra note 112, at 1060. 
126 Lei No. 8.906, de 4 de Julho de 1994, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 5.7.94, art. 65; 
Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1060. 
127 TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 117. 
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Direct Action of Unconstitutionality (ADINs).128 The IAB is small in 
comparison, but it remains an active lawyer organization in some cities 
and it declares itself “an intransigent defender of the democratic state of 
law, national sovereignty and fundamental rights.”129 Brazil also has 
specialty bar organizations, such as the Brazilian Association of Real 
Estate Lawyers, the Brazilian Association of Criminal Lawyers, and 
lawyers’ unions.130  
 3. Japan 
Japan is also a democracy with a civil law legal system. It was not until 
the mid-1870s that the Meiji government enacted regulations that enabled 
advocates (daigennin) to represent litigants in court.131 The state required 
daigennin to form state-approved local organizations in an effort to control 
them.132 In 1893, the Attorney Law created the profession of attorneys, 
renamed as bengoshi.133 That law also created a mandatory bar association 
(bengoshikai) corresponding with the jurisdiction of each district court.134 
The national government regulated the profession through World War II, 
and attempted to control it with varying levels of success.135 In 1949, after 
negotiations between bar associations and the government, a new 
 
 
128 CONSTITUIÇÃO FEDERAL [C.F.] [CONSTITUTION] art. 103 (Braz.); TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 
109, 117-18. Over time, the OAB’s privilege to file ADINS has been granted across most policy areas. 
Taylor, supra, at 117. 
129 História da Instituição, supra note 112; Bonelli, supra note 112, at 1065, 1068-69. 
130 See ASSOCIAÇÃO BRASILEIRA DE ADVOGADOS DO MERCADO IMOBILIÁRIO [BRAZILIAN 
ASS’N OF REAL EST. LAW.], https://abami.org.br/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2019); ASSOCIAÇÃO 
BRASILEIRA DOS ADVOGADOS CRIMINALISTAS  [BRAZILIAN ASS’N OF CRIM. LAW.], 
https://www.abracrim.adv.br/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2019); UNIÃO BRASILEIRA DA ADVOCACIA 
AMBIENTAL [BRAZILIAN UNION OF ENVTL. LAW.], https://ubaaweb.wordpress.com/ (last visited Jan. 
26, 2019); Falcão, supra note 110, at 426-27. 
131 See DARRYL E. FLAHERTY, PUBLIC LAW, PRIVATE PRACTICE: POLITICS, PROFIT, AND THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY JAPAN 99-100 (2013); Richard W. Rabinowitz, The 
Historical Development of the Japanese Bar, 70 HARV. L. REV. 61, 64-65 (1956); What Is the JFBA?, 
supra note 91. Previously, kujishi, who were proprietors of inns at which litigants lodged while 
waiting for courts to hear their cases, sometimes counseled litigants, but they did not have legal 
training. Rabinowitz, supra, at 62-64. 
132 Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa, The State, Civil Society, and the Legal Complex in 
Modern Japan: Continuity and Change, in FIGHTING FOR POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 86, at 151, 
161. 
133 Id. at 160. Today, bengoshi are one of six legal services providers in Japan and the only one 
with full rights of audience in Japanese courts. See Ishida, supra note 11, at 383-85. 
134 CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN § 2.01 [1][c](a) (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., 3d ed. 2018). In 
1923, the Attorney Act was revised so that lawyers could form more than one bar association in a 
jurisdiction, Tokyo bar was subsequently split into three associations. Rabinowitz, supra note 131, at 
72.   
135 See Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 161-66. 
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Practicing Attorney Act was passed.136 The Act created the Japan 
Federation of Bar Associations (JFBA) for bengoshi and made the bar 
associations independent from the Minister of Justice and the Supreme 
Court.137 
Feeley and Setsuo Miyazawa characterize the Japanese legal profession 
as “quintessentially homo politicus.”138 Notwithstanding the government’s 
plan to use lawyer associations to control the profession, from the outset, 
“the bar was at the forefront of challenging a government not accustomed 
to being openly opposed.”139 Indeed, the Japanese government’s efforts to 
restrict the profession over the years “helped define and reinforce the 
profession’s anti-government ethos.140 Thus, in the 1890s, the organized 
bar involved itself in the formation of new political parties that challenged 
the regime.141 Bar associations were organized into committees, most of 
which addressed the protection of rights or the expansion of civil society 
institutions.142 Opposition to the government by the mandatory Japanese 
bar receded in the 1930s, when the government cracked down on 
dissent.143 Yet opposition by the bar reemerged in the post-war period, as 
did its anti-government ethos.144  
Today, bengoshi are required by the Practicing Attorney Act of 1949 to 
register with the JFBA and to belong to one of the fifty-two local bar 
associations.145 The JFBA is composed of about 40,000 bengoshi and 410 
registered foreign lawyers.146 The Act affords the JFBA significant 
authority to regulate the admission and discipline of lawyers. The Act also 
states in Article I that “[a] practicing attorney is entrusted with a mission 
to protect fundamental human rights and to realize social justice.”147 
 
 
136 U.S. occupation officials, who believed that the bar should be independent, aided efforts by 
the bar associations to oppose attempts by the Supreme Court and the Minister of Justice to impose 
greater restrictions on lawyers. ALFRED C. OPPLER, LEGAL REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN: A 
PARTICIPANT LOOKS BACK 108 (1976); Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 175. 
137 Rabinowitz, supra note 131, at 76. 
138 Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 152. 
139 Id. at 161. 
140 Id. In addition, there is no tradition of a strong bond between the courts and the bar, and 
indeed, they are often at odds. See CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 134, at § 2.01 [1][a]; see 
also Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 151 (noting that the conservative judiciary has not sought 
to align itself with the bar, which has “aggressively promoted the idea of autonomous law and the 
liberal state”).  
141 Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 161. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. at 163. 
144 Id. at 175. 
145 Id.; What is the JFBA?, supra note 91. 
146 What is the JFBA?, supra note 91. 
147 Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 175-76. 
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Miyazawa notes that this language expresses a “professional ideology 
which reflects the prewar status of practicing attorneys,” and “appears to 
have actually generated tangible commitments to human rights activities 
by a substantial number of lawyers.”148  
The JFBA president is elected to a two-year term.149 The JFBA 
sponsors nearly 100 special committees that provide networks of resources 
for attorneys handling novel issues on criminal justice, human rights and 
environmental issues.150 The local bars also have authority to form 
committees, to comment on legislation, and to speak out on issues.151 
Other voluntary lawyer organizations active in social and political issues 
include the Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom (formed in 1921),152 
the Japan Young Lawyers Association (formed in 1954), and smaller 
associations of activist attorneys.153 There are also a few specialty lawyer 
organizations such as the Japan Labor Lawyers Association and the Japan 
In-House Lawyers Association.154 
 4. Israel 
Another example of a democracy, Israel has a mostly common law 
legal system that derives from Ottoman and English law.155 The Ottoman 
legal system, which governed until 1917, combined Islamic, European 
(mostly French), and Ottoman legal norms.156 During the British Mandate, 
 
 
148 Setsuo Miyazawa, Lawyering for the Underrepresented in the Context of Legal, Social, and 
National Institutions: The Case of Japan, in EDUCATING FOR JUSTICE AROUND THE WORLD, supra 
note 116, at 19, 21, 22; see also Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 176 (noting that this language 
is more than an “empty slogan” and reaffirms the bar’s “longstanding sense of responsibility, central to 
its ethos”). 
149 Organization, JAPAN FED’N B. ASS’NS, 
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/about/us/organization.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2019). 
150 Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 177. 
151 See, e.g., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN, supra note 134, at § 2.01 [1][c](a); About the Tokyo 
Bar, TOKYO B. ASS’N, https://www.toben.or.jp/english/about/.  
152 The Japan Lawyers Association for Freedom was originally formed to organize the defense of 
striking workers in the shipbuilding industry. Feeley & Miyazawa, supra note 132, at 166. The Japan 
Young Lawyers Association was founded to promote the new Constitution. The latter is one of only a 
few organizations that include lawyers, judges, and legal academics. Id. 
153 Id. at 177. 
154 See LAB. LAW. ASS’N OF JAPAN, http://roudou-bengodan.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 12, 
2019); JAPAN IN-HOUSE LAW. ASS’N, http://jila.jp/eng/index.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2019).  
155 Eyal Katvan et al., Lawyers in Israel: Numbers, Make-up and Modes of Practice, in 
LAWYERS IN 21ST CENTURY SOCIETIES: NATIONAL REPORTS, supra note 122. 
156 Ron Harris et al., Israeli Legal History: Past and Present, in THE HISTORY OF LAW IN A 
MULTICULTURAL SOCIETY: ISRAEL, 1917-1967, at 1, 5 (Ron Harris et al. eds., 2002); Katvan et al., 
supra note 155; Assaf Likhovski, The Time Has Not Yet Come to Repair the World in the Kingdom of 
God: Israeli Lawyers and the Failed Jewish Legal Revolution of 1948, in JEWS AND THE LAW 359, 
362, 363–64 (Ari Mermelstein et al. eds, 2008).  
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the emerging legal profession identified with the English legal system and 
its ideology as a way to ground their Western identity and to distinguish 
themselves from their Arab counterparts in the Ottoman world.157 British 
legal ideology embraced a highly individualistic and formalistic free 
market philosophy.158 According to this view—which Jewish-Palestinian 
lawyers adopted—“[t]he lawyers’ duty is to pursue their clients’ interests 
and the collective good emerges structurally from the system.”159  
After Israel declared independence in 1948, lawyers sought  an 
autonomous bar association, but these efforts were met by suspicion in a 
new state that prized nationalism and collectivism.160 The Israeli 
parliament eventually passed the Israel Bar Association Act of 1961, 
which created the mandatory Israel Bar Association (IBA), and gave it a 
great deal of power and autonomy to govern the legal profession.161 The 
Act stressed that the lawyer’s duty of loyalty to the client was central, with 
no suggestion that lawyers have a commitment to substantive justice or to 
work for the public good.162  
During the first twenty years after Israel declared independence, 
lawyers and judges shared a strong bond because of their similar 
backgrounds and personal ties.163 In addition, both groups were 
marginalized by the state, leading to interdependence between lawyers and 
the judiciary.164 Until the late 1990s, the IBA mainly engaged with issues 
that were directly related to lawyers or the legal system.165 At that time, 
some lawyers began to dissent from the IBA’s apolitical approach and 
promoted the idea that the bar had a collective responsibility to promote 
 
 
157 See Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Constructing Professionalism: The Professional Project of the Israeli 
Judiciary, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 760, 766-67 (2001). 
158 Id. at 769. 
159 Id. 
160 Katvan et al., supra note 155. 
161 Id.; Rosen-Zvi, supra note 157, at 766-67, 780; Neta Ziv, Combining Professionalism, Nation 
Building and Public Service: The Professional Project of the Israeli Bar 1928-2002, 71 FORDHAM L. 
REV 1621, 1640 (2003). The IBA’s power continues to this day. As Limor Zer-Gutman notes, 
“Despite the enormous changes experienced by Israeli society, its law and the legal profession in the 
last half-century since regulation was instituted, no meaningful changes have taken place regarding the 
Bar’s status and powers.” Limor Zer-Gutman, Israel: Regulation of Lawyers and Legal Services in 
Israel, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE REGULATION OF LAWYERS AND LEGAL SERVICES 
139, 140 (Andrew Boon ed., 2017). 
162 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1637-38, 1643-44, 1646-47.  
163 Rosen-Zvi, supra note 157, at 772.  
164 Id. at 774-77. Rosen-Zvi explains that lawyers drew their authority as “guardians of the rule 
of law”—at least in the formalistic sense—from their proximity to judges. Id. at 775. 
165 See, e.g., Ziv, supra note 161, at 1625 (noting that “[i]n an era pervaded by severe human 
rights violations and infringements on the rule of law, the bar maintained its ‘apolitical and 
independent’ stance”). 
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substantive justice.166 Since the early 2000s, when a new IBA president 
entered office with a liberal agenda and demanded that the organization 
take a position on human rights violations in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories,167 the IBA has presented itself as having a special role and 
responsibility in broader debates about public affairs.168 In 2016, at the 
IBA’s suggestion, the language in the IBA Act was amended to state that 
the IBA should “protect the rule of law, human rights and the basic values 
of the State of Israel.”169  
Israel has more than 75,000 lawyers, making it the country with the 
largest per capita number of lawyers in the world.170 The IBA is the only 
bar association in Israel.171 Its president is elected to a four-year term and 
serves as the chair of an elected Central Committee.172 Some Israeli 
lawyers also participate in legal advocacy work through NGOs.173 One 
such organization, Adalah, an NGO primarily composed of Arab-
Palestinian Israeli lawyers, advocates for non-discriminatory treatment of 
Arab-Israeli citizens.174 Another, the Association for Civil Rights in Israel, 
established in 1972, works for human rights in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories.175 
 B. Transitional Governments 
 1. Kyrgyzstan 
Kyrgyzstan, a country in political transition, was dominated at times by 
the Mongolians, Manchurians, and Uzbeks, and became part of the 
 
 
166 Neta Ziv, Human Rights Law and Public Interest Lawyering: A Study on the Interdependence 
of Jurisprudence and the Legal Profession in Israel 82-83 (June 2001) (unpublished J.S.D. dissertation, 
Stanford University) (on file with authors). 
167 Katvan et al., supra note 155; Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 142. 
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Russian empire in 1876.176 During the Soviet period, lawyers who 
represented clients’ private interests were members of legal collectives 
administered by government agencies.177 The 1977 USSR Constitution 
declared collegia of advocates to be independent of the state as “voluntary 
associations of individuals who carry out advocate activity,” although 
oversight of the profession by state bodies and the Communist Party 
continued.178 Kyrgyzstan obtained its independence from the Soviet Union 
in 1991.179 The new government immediately faced the problem of 
widespread corruption, including in the judiciary.180  Following two 
revolutions—in 2005 and 2010—Kyrgyzstan became the first 
parliamentary republic in central Asia.181 
Today Kyrgyzstan is a Muslim majority country comprised mostly of 
ethnic Kyrgyz, ethnic Uzbeks, and Russians.182 “Advocates” are licensed 
legal services providers authorized to represent clients in criminal 
matters.183 “Lawyers” are unlicensed individuals with a law diploma who 
work on legal matters in government, corporations, and on their own.184 
Individuals need no legal training in order to represent parties in civil 
actions.185 
In 1999, the government passed a Law on Advocates’ Activity that 
protected the rights of advocates to join voluntary associations.186 Some 
advocates continued to belong to collegia of advocates. The voluntary 
Association of Attorneys of Kyrgyzstan (AAK), which includes a variety 
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PROGRAM CONCEPT PAPER OF THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC 1, 2 (2007); INT’L CRISIS GRP., KYRGYZSTAN: 
THE CHALLENGE OF JUDICIAL REFORM 1 (2008), https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/150-
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loathed institution. Chris Rickleton, Kyrgyzstan: Unpopular Judiciary Difficult to Reform, 
EURASIANET (Aug. 10, 2012), www.eurasianet.org/node/65246.  
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of legally trained professionals, was formed in 1995 with the assistance of 
the ABA’s Central and Eastern Europe Law Initiative.187 The Advocates’ 
Union (AU), a voluntary organization composed exclusively of advocates, 
was formed in 2002 due to the efforts of the Ministry of Justice.188 Two 
years later, work began on a new Law of Advocacy to regulate advocates 
and create a unified bar. The AAK and the AU supported these efforts 
with “behind the scenes” help from the ABA Rule of Law Initiative (ABA 
ROLI).189 Due to political upheaval in Kyrgyzstan, it was not until 2014 
that the law was passed and a mandatory bar organization, the Advokatura, 
was formed as an independent organization.190 Only practicing advocates 
belong to the Advokatura. Its highest governing body is the elected 
Congress of Advocates, which convenes every three years. Its nine-
member Board of Advocates has broad powers to ensure self-regulation of 
the profession.191 Initially only a small number of advocates joined the 
Advokatura, but its members now number about 2300.192  
 2. Libya 
Libya, another country in transition, was part of the Ottoman Empire 
for about 350 years. Libya came under Italian rule in 1911, was ruled by 
the French and the British beginning in 1943, and became independent in 
1951.193 The national Libyan Bar Association (LBA) was established in 
1962, with five regional bar associations.194 In 1969, Qaddafi led a coup 
and vested his Revolutionary Command Council with legislative, 
 
 
187 SWISS COOPERATION OFFICE IN THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, KYRGYZ REPUBLIC JUDICIAL 
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189 See AZAMAT KERIMBAEV & STEPHEN MACKENZIE, ABA RULE OF LAW INITIATIVE, SUPPORT 
TO THE KYRGYZSTANI LEGAL DEFENSE COMMUNITY QUARTERLY REPORT: APRIL 1, 2013-JUNE 30, 
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executive and judicial authority.195 The LBA maintained its independence 
until 1981, but thereafter, legislation significantly restricted lawyers’ 
activities and the bar came under the control of the regime.196 Lawyers 
were required to become state salaried as members of the Directorate of 
People’s Defense (subsequently known as “people’s lawyers”).197 Even 
after the restoration of lawyers’ right to engage in private practice in the 
1990s,198 the Qaddafi government controlled the selection of bar leaders 
and the manner in which lawyers could practice.199 Lawyers advocated for 
more control over bar leadership in the early 2000s, but were unsuccessful 
during the Qaddafi regime.200 
With the fall of Qaddafi in late 2011, the LBA and its regional bar 
associations quickly became active in their own governance, electing 
provisional officers in early 2012.201 The organization had to overcome 
distrust towards certain lawyers who were viewed as having colluded with 
the Qadaffi regime.202 In 2014, Libya passed a new law on Law Practice 
that made the LBA a mandatory lawyer organization with seven regional 
associations.203 The LBA does not include prosecutors, “people’s 
lawyers,” other government lawyers, or judges; those groups fall under the 
direction of the Minister of Justice.204  
The new law provides for the LBA to select its own leaders and to play 
an important role in the admission and discipline of lawyers.205 The 
General Assembly of the 4000-member LBA chooses a president and 
deputy president.206 The Board of the LBA includes the president, the 
deputy president, and seven members, each representing one of the bar’s 
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branches.207 It has been difficult for the LBA to accomplish its initial 
objectives—such as to draft an ethics code—due to the ongoing violence 
in the country. Other lawyer organizations have also emerged, such as the 
Hakki Organization (women lawyers concerned with the rights of women 
and children),208 the Libyan Organization for Monitoring Human Rights 
Violations,209 and the Libyan Lawyers’ Organization, which focuses on 
transitional justice and constitution building.210  
 C. Authoritarian Government - China 
Lawyers did not emerge as an organized profession in China until the 
early twentieth century.211 After the Communists took power, the 
profession was purged and reconstituted according to the Soviet model 
before it was essentially eliminated in the late 1950s.212 After the rebirth of 
the legal profession in 1979, lawyers were closely embedded in the state 
bureaucracy.213 The new legal profession in China was established by the 
Interim Regulation on Lawyers, which took effect in 1982 and defined 
lawyers as “state legal workers” whose work was to “serve the cause of 
socialism.”214 Privatization of the bar began in the late 1980s and it 
accelerated thereafter.215 The Chinese government deliberately sought to 
rapidly expand the number of lawyers to meet the needs of economic 
reform.216 Today, some elite Chinese lawyers have created mega firms 
modeled after global law firms in England and the United States, including 
with offices outside mainland China.217 Other legal services providers in 
China, known as basic-level legal service workers, can also perform most 
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legal work, except criminal defense.218  
The primary lawyer organization in China is the 340,000-member All-
China Lawyers Association (ACLA), formed in 1986, with mandatory 
membership and close ties to the state. Indeed, ACLA’s Charter lists 
upholding Party membership as the first of its goals.219 China also has 
provincial and municipal lawyers’ organizations, such as the Beijing 
Lawyers Association (BLA).220 The Communist Party maintains control of 
the bar associations through provincial and local justice bureaus, which 
then influence provincial and local bar associations. As Sida Liu and 
Terence Halliday have noted, “Bar Association leaders are appointed from 
above, not elected by lawyers, even if there is a cosmetic ‘election’ to 
confirm appointments.”221 In the early-to-mid 2000s, the BLA had a 
Committee on Constitutional Law and Human Rights, which not only 
provided a platform for progressive lawyers to develop networks, but also 
became involved in some rights defense cases.222 The progressive work of 
the committee was effectively ended by the bar association in 2007.223  
Chinese activist lawyers have also independently engaged in collective 
action, but bar associations have rarely supported those efforts.224 One 
such community, the “die-hard” lawyers, emerged in 2011, in part as a 
response to government prosecution of lawyers who were vigorously 
defending their clients.225 The die-hard lawyers came from all over China 
and communicated primarily through social media.226 In 2015, the Chinese 
government initiated a large-scale crackdown on activist lawyers, with 
more than two hundred questioned, detained, imprisoned or 
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“disappeared.”227 Some bar associations have also disciplined lawyers for 
their statements against the bar association and the regime.228 
III. FROM OCCUPATIONAL CONCERNS TO HUMAN RIGHTS: ACTIVITIES 
BY LAWYER ORGANIZATIONS 
How have the lawyer organizations in these seven countries tried to 
affect law over the last forty years? When have they promoted legal 
changes or worked to protect the legal status quo? Case studies of these 
countries during this period suggest activities that fall along a continuum 
from the most self-interested to the most altruistic. In some ways, as will 
be discussed below, this continuum mirrors the different perspectives in 
organizational theory, with activities that range from narrow professional 
concerns, to those of clients, the judiciary and the administration of 
justice, and to broader engagement with political issues. These four 
(sometimes overlapping) categories provide a framework for our 
discussion of the advocacy efforts of the lawyer associations. 
 A. Working for Issues Affecting the Legal Profession as an Occupation  
Not surprisingly for an occupational interest group, lawyer 
organizations often attempt to exert influence on issues that directly affect 
lawyers’ ability to perform and profit from their work. They seek to 
define, expand or defend their monopoly on the provision of legal 
services, raise their status, or improve their economic circumstances. In 
order to facilitate these efforts, lawyer organizations work to attain or 
preserve the right to self-regulate. They also speak out in defense of 
lawyers who are threatened or prosecuted. 
 1. Self-regulation 
Many lawyer organizations view the right to self-regulate as necessary 
for lawyers to maintain their independence from government domination, 
and to protect the judicial system and defend against incursions on 
individual liberties by the state.229 In the United States, the ABA Model 
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Rules of Professional Conduct proclaim the importance of self-regulation 
by the legal profession.230 U.S. bar organizations have fought for lawyers 
to maintain the right to promulgate their own rules of professional conduct 
without interference by Congress, federal agencies, or state legislatures. 
For example, the ABA opposed efforts by Congress to impose gatekeeper 
obligations on lawyers that would require them to reveal confidential 
information to prevent money laundering. The ABA argued, in part, that 
such legislation would undermine attorney-client privilege, confidentiality, 
traditional state court regulation of the profession, and lawyer 
independence.231 Likewise, the California State Bar unsuccessfully fought 
efforts by the state legislature to move control of the lawyer discipline 
system from a lawyer-dominated process to a more independent State Bar 
court.232  
Similar attempts to preserve self-regulation of the legal profession can 
be seen in Israel, where the IBA advised and lobbied against efforts to 
amend the Bar Act in ways that could affect the IBA’s governance and 
power.233 For example, in 2008, the IBA successfully limited proposals to 
significantly reduce the IBA’s control over the lawyer discipline process 
through advocacy within the Ministry of Justice and among Knesset 
members.234 Likewise, when a public commission proposed amendments 
to the IBA Act that would reform the structure and control of the IBA, the 
organization vigorously opposed those efforts. The resulting 2016 
amendments largely ended up reflecting the IBA’s position.235 
In some emerging democracies with little history of lawyer self-
regulation, the story is different and reflects the limits on lawyers’ 
independence due to their historical relationship to the state. After the fall 
of the Soviet Union, the Ministry of Justice in Kyrgyzstan oversaw 
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regulation of the legal profession.236 Starting in 2004, activist lawyers in 
Kyrgyzstan began drafting legislation providing for a self-regulatory 
model of lawyer regulation with a unified, compulsory bar association.237 
Some advocates opposed the creation of the compulsory Advokatura in 
2014 for reasons including fear that the association would be used by 
authorities to interfere with lawyer independence and suspicion of 
bureaucracies.238 Indeed, five defense advocates filed a complaint with the 
Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan challenging the constitutionality of the 
legislation requiring lawyers to join the Advokatura, but that challenge 
failed.239 
In Libya, self-regulation by the legal profession was impossible after 
Qaddafi nationalized the Libyan legal profession in 1981.240 Libyan 
lawyers’ collective efforts were largely aimed at obtaining some control 
over their bar organizations. For example, in 2005 lawyers protested after 
the Qaddafi regime appointed a leader to the Benghazi Bar Association 
against the members’ will, and again in early 2011, when he overstayed 
his term.241 In 2010 they demonstrated for the right to form a lawyers’ 
union.242 Only after Qaddafi’s fall did the LBA help draft a law in 2013, 
with assistance from ABA ROLI, giving them the right to hold their own 
elections of bar association leaders and the right to self-regulate.243  
In China, lawyer self-regulation does not operate in any meaningful 
way. ACLA operates under control of the Ministry of Justice.244 In 2008 
some activist Chinese lawyers attempted to challenge state control over 
the BLA by asking for the direct election of officers and for a decrease in 
the mandatory bar fees.245 The BLA responded that the election process 
was democratic and that “inflammatory” statements to the contrary 
violated the law.246 After intense political conflict, the BLA made a few 
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symbolic concessions, including a reduction in membership fees, but at 
least twenty lawyers who led the fight for change were disbarred or forced 
out of their law firms.247 Further evidence of the government’s tight 
control of lawyer regulation can be seen in 2016 administrative regulations 
that require lawyers to establish Communist party branches in law firms.248 
 2. Controlling Size and Quality of the Profession 
As suggested by market control theory, many lawyer organizations also 
seek to control admission to the bar, thereby limiting the size of the legal 
profession. In the United States, at the time of the ABA’s founding, it 
established a Committee on Legal Education to tighten admission 
requirements.249 As Abel notes, “the battle to control supply was waged on 
a number of fronts.”250 During the early twentieth century, the ABA 
worked to persuade state licensing authorities to adopt heightened entry 
requirements, including that lawyers attend law school and pass a rigorous 
bar examination.251  
In some other countries with well-established lawyer organizations, the 
organizations worked aggressively to limit the number of new lawyers 
admitted to practice. For example, in Japan, where the bar passage rate for 
the National Bar Examination was fixed at less than three percent as late 
as 1998, the JFBA strenuously opposed efforts by the Ministry of Justice 
to raise the number of applicants allowed to pass the bar examination 
annually.252 In 2001, the Justice System Reform Council recommended 
that the pass rate be increased to 3000 examinees by 2010, but that rate has 
never been reached.253 The JFBA has frequently advocated to limit the 
number of successful bar examinees and to reduce the number of law 
schools.254 In 2015, it succeeded in convincing the government to reduce 
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the annual cap on the number of lawyers who could be admitted from 
2000 to 1500.255 Likewise in Israel, the IBA has warned since the 1960s 
about the “overcrowding” of the profession.256 The IBA has both acted 
unilaterally and with the assistance of the Ministry of Justice to make it 
more difficult for applicants to pass the bar examination.257 It has also 
successfully lobbied to extend the apprenticeship period, a prerequisite for 
taking the bar examination.258 In Brazil, the OAB pressed the government 
to control the number of university places for law students to reduce the 
number of lawyers produced.259 When that failed, the OAB made the bar 
examination mandatory in 1994 to limit the number of practicing 
lawyers.260 Lawyer organizations claim that these measures help ensure 
the quality of lawyers for the public’s benefit,261 but their efforts also act 
as a form of market control.  
Legal professions must also maintain lawyer quality and ethical 
behavior so that the public holds lawyers in high esteem, trusts lawyers to 
represent them, and permits the profession to self-regulate.262 Lawyer 
organizations therefore seek to influence the law through ethical rules and 
disciplinary processes that sanction lawyers for rule violations. In the 
United States, the ABA promulgates model ethical rules which state courts 
 
 
31; Stacey Steele, Japan’s National Bar Exam: Results from 2015 and the Impact of the Preliminary 
Qualifying Examination, 41 J. JAPAN L. 55, 60 (2016).  
255 See Murayama, supra note 252. 
256 Eyal Katvan, The “Overcrowding of the Profession” Argument and the Professional Melting 
Pot, 19 INT’L J. LEGAL PROF. 301, 304 (2012).  
257 See Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 151-52; Yonah Jeremy Bob, Is Bar Association Trying to 
Drive Away Olim?, JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 6, 2016), http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Is-Bar-
Association-trying-to-drive-away-olim-440650; Evelyn Gordon, Law Students Take Bar to Court Over 
Exam, THE JERUSALEM POST, Apr. 23, 1996. In recent years, due to changes in the bar exam made 
possible by an amendment to the IBA Act initiated by the IBA president, the passage rate has dropped 
from 70-80% to 30%. See Limor Zer-Gutman, Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the 
Legal Profession 10 (2019) [hereinafter Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Legal 
Profession] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).  
258 Katvan et al., supra note 155 (discussing the IBA’s “incessant preoccupation” with the length 
of the apprenticeship). 
259 Falcão, supra note 110, at 424-25. More recently, the OAB has developed its own evaluation 
of law schools to place pressure on the government and to restrain the proliferation of schools. Bonelli 
& Fortes, supra note 122. 
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261 See Kay-Wah Chan, Justice System Reform and Legal Ethics in Japan, 14 LEGAL ETHICS 73, 
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largely adopt and impose on lawyers.263 The ABA has also promulgated 
model rules of disciplinary enforcement for states to follow when handling 
grievances against lawyers.264 Likewise, lawyer organizations in Brazil, 
Israel, and Japan have drafted codes of lawyer conduct and rules relating 
to discipline pursuant to statutory authority.265 Even in countries with 
fragile governments and legal systems, like Kyrgyzstan and Libya, lawyer 
organizations have proposed legislation governing lawyers that contains 
ethical standards and disciplinary processes.266 International lawyer 
organizations sometimes assist national lawyer groups with these 
efforts.267   
3. Defining, Expanding and Defending the Market 
In many countries, lawyer organizations have sought to influence the 
law so as to define, expand, or defend their turf, that is, the territory in 
which lawyers are the exclusive providers of legal services. The precise 
scope of the legal professions’ exclusive turf differs in every country, but 
typically encompasses, at a minimum, representation of clients in courts of 
general jurisdiction.268 Lawyer organizations in some countries are 
attempting to expand lawyers’ turf or defend it from incursions by other 
service providers, demonstrating rational action to advance lawyers’ 
interests through market control. Elsewhere the organizations are still 
working to define the areas in which lawyers have the exclusive right to 
practice law. Their circumstances and actions are shaped by lawyers’ 
history in those countries and the nature of the state. 
Where legal professions have already staked out their exclusive turf, 
lawyer organizations often work to preserve lawyers’ monopoly over the 
 
 
263 See ABA CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS (1908). The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
have been adopted in some form in forty-nine states and the District of Columbia. Alphabetical List of 
Jurisdictions Adopting Model Rules, A.B.A. (Aug. 17, 2018), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professi
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264 See ABA MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENF’T (2002).  
265 See, e.g., Lei No. 8.906, de 4 de Julho de 1994, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 
5.7.94; Bengoshihō [Attorney Act], Law No. 205 of June 10, 1949, art. 33 (vii)-(viii) (Japan); OAB, 
Código de Ética e Disciplina da Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil [Code of Ethics and Discipline of the 
OAB] (2015), http://s.oab.org.br/PDF/CFOAB-CED.pdf  (Braz.); Bar Association Rules (Professional 
Ethics), 5746-1986 (Isr.); Bar Association Rules (Procedures in Disciplinary Courts), 5722-1962 (Isr.).  
266 See, e.g., ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 53-54; INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 
190, at 6; Telephone Interview with Kevin George, supra note 201. 
267 See Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen, supra note 18, at 462-63. 
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provision of legal services. For example in Israel, the IBA has vigorously 
enforced provisions in the IBA Act that prohibit the unauthorized practice 
of law to ensure lawyers remain the exclusive providers of legal 
services.269 It has brought litigation to prevent non-lawyer service 
providers from assisting clients in filing claims in areas including family, 
debt collection, disability and medical entitlements.270 For a while, it even 
resisted efforts by law school clinics to provide legal representation.271 The 
IBA has also fought the incursion of online legal services providers.272 In 
the United States, state bar associations have challenged LegalZoom and 
other online providers that compete with lawyers for work.273 In 
Washington State, some bar organizations fought the creation of a new 
class of legal services providers called limited license legal technicians, 
who can provide legal advice in the area of family law.274 In Brazil, the 
OAB fought efforts to create a separate paralegal profession, calling such 
efforts “unconstitutional.”275 In Japan, the JFBA unsuccessfully opposed 
efforts by other legal services providers to change the law so that judicial 
scriveners could appear in summary courts and administrative scriveners 
could represent clients in certain administrative actions.276  
In some countries, lawyer organizations have not only sought to 
 
 
269 Katvan et al., supra note 155; Zer-Gutman, supra note 161, at 156-57; Ziv, supra note 233, at 
1776-77. 
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2014), 
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prevent incursions by non-lawyers on their turf, but have worked to limit 
the impact of global lawyer competitors. After Brazil saw an influx of 
competitors from large global law firms in the 1990s, the OAB’s Federal 
Bar Council issued a rule in 2000 prohibiting foreign lawyers from 
engaging in litigation in Brazil or advising clients on Brazilian law.277 In 
2011, it acted to further limit foreign lawyers’ ability to do business by 
prohibiting associations between Brazilian and foreign law firms and 
punishing firms that maintained such alliances.278 These debates about 
regulation of foreign law firms reflected conflict over turf as well as 
ideological differences over the essence of lawyering in Brazil: traditional 
“public lawyering” with its constitutionally protected status vs. lawyering 
as a commodity.279 Such internal organizational conflicts reveal 
differences over values and taken-for-granted ways of viewing the world, 
a central focus of new institutionalism.  
Similarly, in Japan in the 1980s, the JFBA fought hard to limit 
competition by foreign lawyers, and battled with the Japanese government 
and the ABA concerning the right of foreign lawyers to practice in 
Japan.280 The JFBA’s continued efforts to limit competition by foreign 
lawyers long prevented foreign law firms from being able to open branch 
offices in Japan, even though Japanese law firms could do so.281 Likewise 
in Israel, the IBA unsuccessfully objected to an amendment to the IBA Act 
to permit foreign lawyers to work in Israel, but it was nevertheless able to  
limit the scope of foreign lawyers’ permissible work and to prevent them 
from forming partnerships with Israeli lawyers.282 
In developing countries, lawyer organizations focus first on defining 
lawyers’ turf and protecting their economic interests. In Libya, lawyer 
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organizations helped draft the 2014 Law on Legal Practice, which 
provides that only Libyan citizens who reside in Libya can be admitted to 
appear in court.283 Libyan lawyers may not use non-lawyers to assist them 
in practicing law or as intermediaries.284 Foreign lawyers may only appear 
in court with the permission of the bar association’s president, and those 
lawyers must work with a Libyan lawyer.285 The law further advances 
Libyan lawyers’ economic interests by requiring foreign companies to 
consult with a Libyan lawyer before performing any activities in Libya.286 
Although Kyrgyzstan’s laws governing law practice are not as restrictive, 
only citizens are permitted to become licensed advocates.287 Currently, 
individuals without legal training can represent parties in civil cases in 
Kyrgyzstan,288 but the Advokatura is exploring whether licensed advocates 
should seek a monopoly over client representation in civil cases.289  
In contrast, in China, where lawyers exercise little control over the 
lawyer organizations, “jurisdictional boundaries between different groups 
of law practitioners are often poorly defined and interprofessional 
competition is prevalent.”290 Thus, while lawyers have consolidated their 
status as the primary legal profession in China, they “have not achieved 
any durable monopoly.”291 The Ministry of Justice allowed foreign law 
firms to establish a presence in mainland China in 1992, but they are not 
permitted to handle “Chinese legal affairs” or to employ licensed Chinese 
lawyers.292 Nevertheless, the government does not actively enforce these 
rules.293 In 2006, the Shanghai Lawyers Association decried rule violations 
by foreign law firms—along with other alleged “illegal business 
activities”—but the Ministry of Justice took no meaningful action.294 The 
government’s inaction was likely due, in part, to concerns that limiting the 
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legal work of foreign law firms in China might also limit foreign 
investment there.295 
 4. Self Defense 
In some countries, lawyer organizations seek to influence the law in 
order to protect lawyers’ physical safety and their ability to perform their 
work without imprisonment or loss of their law licenses. They do this to 
help lawyers survive individually and as a profession.296 For example, in 
Kyrgyzstan, some advocates faced physical attacks and threats of 
prosecution.297 In 2010, before formation of the Advokatura, a group of 
161 advocates demanded that Kyrgyz authorities guarantee security in 
court cases after threats and assaults on them and their clients in the 
courthouse.298 The 2014 Law on Advokatura, which advocate groups 
helped draft, included protections for advocates when performing their 
work, including from arrests.299 In 2017, the Advokatura formed a 
commission that met with the Chief Prosecutor and subsequently 
recommended sending a letter to the Prosecutor’s Office urging that 
attacks on advocates be prosecuted under the same statute covering attacks 
on judges and prosecutors.300 Ultimately, the letter was not sent because of 
a lack of consensus within the organization, as some advocates represented 
families of victims who engaged in some of the violence against the 
lawyers.301 
Similarly, in Libya in 2011, members of the Benghazi Bar Association 
participated in protests following the Qaddafi regime’s arrest of lawyer 
Fathi Terbil, a human rights lawyer.302 After the fall of the regime, 
lawyers, prosecutors, and judges endured frequent threats and physical 
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296 Indeed, the United Nations Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers has stated 
that bar associations have a role to play in assisting lawyers who are arrested or detained. See Leandro 
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attacks.303 The LBA issued statements calling for the protection of 
lawyers.304 In 2015, the LBA held demonstrations at the Tripoli 
courthouse to protest the assaults, arrests, and detentions of lawyers and 
others associated with the legal profession.305 Again in 2017, the LBA held 
street protests after militia kidnapped a Tripoli lawyer.306  
The need to defend lawyers also arises in China, but the state-
controlled lawyer organizations rarely act to defend their members. In the 
early 2000s some criminal defense lawyers were arrested or imprisoned 
when acting to represent their clients.307 For example, the Inner Mongolia 
Lawyers Association brought close to a hundred lawyers to attend the 
2003 trial of Ma Guangjun, a defense lawyer who was criminally 
prosecuted for allegedly advising witnesses in his client’s criminal case to 
commit perjury.308 Criminal defense lawyers sometimes posted comments 
on the ACLA internet bulletin board to resist state power and publicize the 
issues; the website enabled lawyers “to reveal problems, exchange 
opinions, and promote collective ideologies.”309 Ultimately, however, the 
ACLA forum was effectively shut down after 2007 due to the political 
nature of some of the discussion.310 Thereafter, some Chinese lawyers 
continued to communicate via the internet and even engaged in protest.  
One instance of this collective mobilization occurred in defense of Li 
Zhuang in a trial that attracted great attention. Li Zhuang, a lawyer from a 
prestigious Beijing law firm, was hired to represent a client charged with 
organized crime activities in Chongqing.311 Li himself was then charged 
by local authorities with violation of “Big Stick 306,” essentially 
“lawyer’s perjury” committed in connection with his work.312 His case in 
2009-2011 provided a catalyst for Chinese lawyers’ frustration over the 
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https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/24/libya-icc-judges-reject-sanussi-appeal. At least four judges and 
prosecutors were the victims of political assassinations in 2013. Id. 
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government’s abusive practice of arresting lawyers for simply defending 
clients charged with crimes. Connecting through online networks such as 
Weibo, scholars and “legal professionals from all over China 
demonstrated an extraordinary degree of collective solidarity” in defense 
of Li.313 Hundreds of lawyers and law students showed up at his trial.314 
ACLA and the local bar associations remained quiet or opposed this 
informal mobilization of lawyers.315 Shortly following Li’s release in 
2011, after four other lawyers were detained in Beihai, Guangxi Province, 
under Article 306, lawyers formed a group to provide legal assistance and 
called for ACLA’s attention to the case. Eventually ACLA and the 
Guangxi Lawyers Association expressed support for the accused 
lawyers.316 After the 2011 crackdown, other activist lawyers continued to 
work together in a coordinated fashion through their networked, close-knit 
community, but outside the government-controlled bar organizations.317 
Global organizations have supported these efforts.318 
 B.  Acting on Issues to Benefit Clients (but also Sometimes Benefitting 
Lawyers)   
Lawyer organizations also act to influence the law in order to benefit 
clients. In doing so, they can be seen as rational actors, because these 
efforts may also benefit lawyers. Benefits can include making it easier for 
lawyers to predict legal outcomes, broadening the market for lawyers’ 
services, or preserving the attorney-client relationship. At the same time, 
organizational advocacy to benefit clients may reflect the shared values of 
key actors within the organization and their clients. 
In countries where legal professions are relatively weak with respect to 
the state, lawyer organizations may first act to influence the criminal law. 
In China, as just noted, criminal defense emerged as a crucial site for 
struggle between the legal profession and the authoritarian state. 
Discussions on the ACLA forum, for example, reveal the challenges 
lawyer confront when representing criminal defendants.319 Activist 
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lawyers also mobilized as “die-hard lawyers” to protect their clients in 
criminal cases. For example, in 2012, Zhou Ze organized a group of over 
100 lawyers to defend 57 defendants in an organized crime case in the 
Guizhou Province.320 During the trial, die-hard lawyers wrote six open 
letters to the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuracy, 
the Minister of Justice, and provincial authorities in Guizhou.321 In 2015, 
human rights lawyers representing the family of a police shooting victim 
in Qingan mobilized the public and the media to hold police accountable 
and to highlight abuses of police power.322 Such advocacy in the criminal 
context has become less prevalent since the government’s 2015 crack-
down on lawyers.  
Bar associations in China also occasionally attempt to influence the law 
on commercial issues in ways that benefit their clients. For example, in 
2004, the BLA submitted a legislative opinion—after the Legislative 
Affairs Office solicited it—regarding a draft Corporation Act Amendment. 
The Legislative Affairs Office ultimately adopted the legislative 
suggestions from the BLA, which recommended that the initial investment 
for a limited liability company (LLC) should be reduced from 100,000 
RMB to 50,000 RMB.323 Since then, the BLA has held conferences to 
discuss specific laws.324 For instance, in 2012, the BLA’s Committee on 
Media and Publication submitted a legislative opinion concerning the Film 
Industry Promotion Law, which sought to promote industry interests under 
the tax laws, lower the initial investment threshold, and otherwise help to 
develop the international market.325 In 2013, BLA committees initiated a 
conference to prepare a legislative draft memo concerning legal regulation 
of LLCs that would, among other things, save transition costs for the 
companies.326 
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In countries with more autonomous legal professions such as the 
United States, lawyer organizations often seek to influence the law to 
promote their clients’ interests. For example, the ABA recently opposed 
provisions in the draft Counter Terrorism and Illicit Finance Act because it 
would “impose burdensome and intrusive regulations on millions of small 
businesses and their lawyers.”327 When business interests pushed tort law 
reform to curb personal injury and product liability litigation and cap 
damages, the Association of Trial Lawyers of America vigorously 
opposed it.328 This opposition from the plaintiffs’ bar was designed to 
protect their clients– injured plaintiffs–by preserving their opportunity for 
full recovery. But preventing such reforms would also advantage the 
lawyers by preserving their fees and client base. Likewise, the American 
Immigration Lawyers Association has worked to increase the number of 
visas available for skilled workers,329 which benefits their clients while 
also providing more work for immigration lawyers. In these cases, it was 
voluntary organizations that pursued these goals, rather than mandatory 
state bars, which are more heterogeneous in their interests and more 
constrained in their ability to act. 
Lawyer organizations in other democratic countries also occasionally 
act to influence the law in ways that directly benefit clients. In Israel, the 
IBA threatened to take Israel’s Prisons Service to court when it changed 
its rules to limit defense lawyers’ prison visits to clients.330 The IBA also 
opposed efforts to raise the monetary limit for small claims court, where 
parties are not represented by lawyers. The IBA noted that defendants 
(often their business clients) could not choose the venue for hearing the 
claim and would be forced into that forum.331 This change also would have 
hurt Israeli lawyers by allowing more parties to litigate without them. In 
Japan, the Japan Labor Lawyers Association issued a statement during the 
debate over the revision of the Working Hours law, calling for changes in 
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the working hours system that would benefit their clients, who are 
generally employees.332   
Lawyer organizations have also worked together to oppose 
international regulatory efforts that could hurt their clients. For example, 
bar associations, including the International Bar Association, the Council 
of Bars and Law Societies of Europe, the ABA, and the JFBA, negotiated 
with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body 
that was developing anti-money laundering standards, to resist 
requirements that lawyers report their clients’ suspicious financial 
transactions.333 Subsequently, the JFBA opposed money laundering 
legislation in Japan that would require lawyers to report suspicious 
financial deals that they become aware of, arguing that it would 
“undermine clients’ confidence in lawyers.”334 In Israel, the IBA also 
vigorously opposed such gatekeeping requirements.335 The OAB filed a 
lawsuit after a 2012 anti-money laundering law went into effect in an 
effort to exempt Brazilian attorneys from having to disclose such 
information about their clients.336 In the United States, the ABA has 
repeatedly opposed federal legislation that would bring lawyers under the 
Bank Secrecy Act regulations or impose other disclosure requirements on 
lawyers.337 These efforts benefits clients—whose activities may otherwise 
be reported to law enforcement authorities—and lawyers as well, who 
would be forced to choose between obeying the law and preserving client 
relationships. The efforts also illustrate the importance of global 
collaboration among lawyer organizations as they develop strategies for 
responding to new legal threats and initiatives.  
 
 
 
332 See The Labour Lawyers Association of Japan Issues a Statement on the Debate over 
Revision of the Working Hours Law, JAPAN INST. FOR LAB. POL’Y & TRAINING (2006), 
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 C.  Issues Directly Affecting Courts and the Administration of Justice.  
Lawyer organizations also seek to improve the administration of justice 
or the legitimacy of the judicial system. In some cases, lawyer 
organizations take the lead or work cooperatively with courts or legislative 
bodies to improve the administration of justice. They also act to protect 
courts from threats to judicial independence or to the courts’ legitimacy, 
thereby supporting the shared values of this institutional sector.  In other 
cases, the organizations oppose the courts when lawyers view them as 
corrupt, overreaching, or inefficient. 
 1. Improving and Protecting the Judicial System 
As Halliday and Karpik have noted, “as a political reality, bar 
autonomy cannot be dealt with as a separate fact in any country” and “is 
linked to the relative autonomy of judges and the courts.”338 Thus, lawyers 
have a vested interest in securing or maintaining the independence of the 
judiciary. In some countries, lawyers also view their own standing as tied 
to the legitimacy of the judicial system. In the United States, for example, 
bar associations have worked to improve the courts, devoting substantial 
resources to, inter alia, judicial selection, procedural rules, and court 
administration.339 They will also defend the courts against attacks on the 
courts’ legitimacy. This can be seen in bar organizations’ responses to 
President Donald Trump’s attacks on judges, which appeared to be an 
attempt to intimidate judges or undermine the legitimacy of their 
decisions. In one such episode, then-candidate Trump claimed that a 
federal judge who was hearing two cases involving Trump University was 
treating him “very unfairly,” and had “an absolute conflict” of interest 
because of the judge’s “Mexican heritage.”340 ABA President Paulette 
Brown swiftly responded, “levying personal criticism at an individual 
judge for lawfully made decisions crosses the line of propriety and risks 
 
 
338 HALLIDAY & KARPIK, supra note 9, at 33. 
339 See HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 150-52, 161-63; POWELL, supra note 1, at 196-200; AM. 
BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, 
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340 Brent Kendall, Trump Says Judge’s Mexican Heritage Presents “Absolute Conflict,” Wall St. 
J. (June 3, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-keeps-up-attacks-on-judge-gonzalo-
curiel-1464911442. He also threatened possible legal action against the judge. See Debra Cassens 
Weiss, Trump Suggests Possibility of Civil Case against Federal Judge; What About a Recusal 
Motion?, ABA J. (June 2, 2016), 
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undermining judicial independence.”341 In a later instance, after a federal 
judge enjoined Trump’s executive order banning immigrants from seven 
Muslim-majority countries, Trump referred to the ruling of the “so-called 
judge” as “ridiculous.”342 ABA President Linda Klein replied that 
“personal attacks on judges are attacks on our constitution” and that “we 
as lawyers are called upon to protect it.”343  
Even in countries where judges and lawyers are not as closely aligned, 
lawyer organizations sometimes take steps to defend the judicial system. 
For example, in Japan, the JFBA has issued recommendations to institute 
and improve a lay judge system.344 It has also called for increased funding 
of the judiciary.345 Similarly, in Brazil, the OAB has called for the hiring 
of more judges to speed up the processing of cases.346 Of course, some of 
these efforts to improve the courts benefit lawyers and their clients as well, 
by making it easier to navigate the judicial system. 
In countries with weaker lawyer organizations, these organizations also 
sometimes work to bolster the independence and workings of the courts. 
Libya’s Tripoli Bar Association, in partnership with a transitional justice 
program, ran the Libyan Trial Monitoring Network, which was established 
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http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/klein_the_aba_must_defend_the_rule_of_law_and_the_indep
encence_of_the_judic. 
344 Activities to Improve the Legal System, JAPAN FED’N B. ASS’NS, 17, 30, 
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/en/about/data/JFBA_Brochure.pdf ; Proposal Concerning 
Reform of the Saiban-in (Lay Judge) Trial System for the Post Third Year Review of the 
Implementation of the Saiban-in Act, JAPAN FED’N B. ASS’NS (Mar. 15, 2012), 
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in 2013 to support the right to a fair trial, promote accountability, and 
assist in judicial reform.347 In Kyrgyzstan, the AAK worked with the 
Supreme Court and NGOs to monitor and evaluate activities aimed at 
increasing the independence of the judiciary and reducing rampant 
corruption in the legal system.348 It is not clear, however, whether these 
activities were initiated by local lawyer organizations or by other actors.349  
Nevertheless, lawyer organizations do not always support the courts. 
When they believe the courts are acting unfairly, exceeding their power, or 
acting against lawyers’ interests, the organizations may oppose them. For 
example, in Japan, the Hokkaido Bar Association lodged a protest against 
the Sapporo High Court for rendering decisions so quickly that it appeared 
the judges were not carefully considering the cases.350 Brazil’s OAB has 
sharply criticized the courts for not acting to address serious backlogs.351 
One OAB president criticized judges for only working on Tuesdays, 
Wednesdays and Thursdays and called on them to work longer hours to 
reduce the backlog.352  
In Israel, the IBA’s efforts to influence law with respect to the judicial 
system illustrate the complicated relations of bar association leaders and 
the shifting dynamics among lawyer organizations, courts, and other state 
actors. The IBA is “an important venue of political struggles” and election 
to bar leadership offers a platform for politically ambitious lawyers.353 
IBA presidents can—and do—speak out on issues without consulting with 
the larger membership, because of its hierarchical leadership structure. 
After three decades of harmonious relations between bench and bar, in 
1992, the IBA president accused the judiciary of corruption and claimed 
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that judges were appointing their close friends to administer 
receiverships.354 Then in 1996, the IBA—along with influential leaders—
began to criticize the Supreme Court’s political activism under the 
leadership of Chief Justice Aharon Barak.355 The same IBA president 
claimed that the Supreme Court had exceeded its institutional power, the 
judicial system did not function properly in other respects, and it was 
collapsing under its caseload.356 These attacks came shortly after the 
Supreme Court issued two decisions unfavorable to the IBA’s interests.357 
The IBA president’s statements infuriated the judiciary and also created 
internal rifts within the IBA.358 Yet by 2001, a new IBA president was 
defending the Supreme Court against attacks by religious members of the 
Knesset who called for constitutional issues to be heard by a different 
court.359 And in 2007, an IBA president called for the appointment of a 
public committee to protect the independence of the judicial system.360  
Nevertheless, in 2015, the IBA again drew the Supreme Court’s ire by 
publishing the results of lawyers’ evaluations of judges and justices.361 The 
IBA president defended the survey as necessary to help improve the 
judicial system, while the court claimed that the government’s oversight of 
the judiciary was sufficient, suggesting that the survey was carried out for 
political reasons.362 According to one news report, the underlying 
disagreement reflected a broader battle between the Supreme Court 
president and the IBA president “over the future of the association, which 
bodies of lawyers should run it, and its relations with the court.”363 Yet in 
2017, the IBA threatened to have its members strike to show solidarity 
with judges in order to obtain an increase in judges’ pensions.364 The 
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356 Id.; Rosen-Zvi, supra note 157, at 809-810. 
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pensions depend on years of service on the bench, making judges reluctant 
to retire and hindering the appointment of new judges. The IBA president 
argued that, “the ones who are paying the price are the attorneys and the 
litigants.”365 Thus, while the IBA’s motivations for their actions were 
mixed, they suggest some effort to improve the judiciary and to ensure that 
it serves its proper role in a democracy. 
In China, the legal profession must contend with a judiciary that is 
“treated as an administrative arm of the Party-state.”366 Through online 
discussions and organized activities, criminal defense lawyers have 
expressed their grievances about specific cases and sought to hold courts 
accountable. For example, as previously noted, in 2012 Zhou Ze organized 
a lawyer group through the Twitter-like Weibo to travel to Guizhou 
province to represent fifty-seven defendants in an organized crime case.367 
Through Weibo and blogs, the group “reported on the court hearings in 
real time . . . and exposed serious procedural violations by the judges and 
prosecutors.368 In 2014, over 200 lawyers in China signed an open letter to 
government authorities after a judge ordered a lawyer who was 
representing a practitioner of Falun Gong to be physically removed from 
the courtroom because the lawyer persisted in making a constitutional 
argument in his client’s defense.369   
 2. Access to Justice 
Access to justice and primarily, access to legal representation, is 
another area in which lawyer organizations seek to influence the law. 
Many individuals throughout the world cannot afford a lawyer or 
adequately represent their own legal interests. This undermines respect for 
the courts and the administration of justice. The United Nations Basic 
Principles on the Role of Lawyers state that “[g]overnments shall ensure 
the sufficient funding and other resources for legal services to the poor, 
and as necessary, to other disadvantaged persons.”370 Nevertheless, few 
countries adequately fund legal aid. Lawyer organizations often advocate 
for greater access to legal representation and increased funding for legal 
aid. 
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Japan’s bar has a long-standing commitment to supporting legal aid. 
The JFBA and the Japan Civil Liberties Union established Japan’s Legal 
Aid Association in 1952, which provided civil legal aid to the indigent.371 
The JFBA also advocated for the Civil Legal Aid Act in 2000, which 
placed the responsibility on the government for supporting the legal aid 
system.372 In addition, the JFBA has advocated for increased funding and 
expanded legal aid.373 The JFBA has also issued eleven “declarations on 
judicial reform” since 1990 in an effort to make the justice system more 
accessible to its users.374  
In the United States, the ABA urged the Senate in 1974 to pass 
legislation forming the Legal Services Corporation (“LSC”) to help fund 
civil legal services for persons of limited means.375 When President 
Ronald Reagan attempted to eliminate the LSC during the 1980s, the ABA 
lobbied Congress to preserve it and to resist financial cuts.376 Since then, 
the ABA and other U.S. bar organizations have consistently opposed cuts 
and advocated for increased funding for legal services for the poor.377 
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Some voluntary lawyer organizations have also advocated for a “civil 
Gideon” requirement that would require the government to provide 
indigent individuals with legal representation in certain civil cases.378 
In Brazil, the 1988 Constitution, drafted with OAB’s help, provides 
that “the state shall provide full and free-of-charge legal assistance to all 
who prove insufficiency of funds.”379 In most courts, parties must be 
represented by a lawyer.380 The Constitution provides for the creation of 
states’ Public Defender’s Offices for individuals who cannot afford a 
lawyer,381 but some states failed to establish such offices. Instead, the 
government relied on the ad hoc appointment of private lawyers to provide 
legal aid in civil and criminal cases, paying the lawyers from government 
funds.382 A public defenders’ association successfully challenged the 
constitutionality of relying entirely on private lawyers in Santa Catarina 
and São Paulo, forcing these states to create public defender’s offices. 383   
Today, public defenders cannot meet the demand for legal 
representation and so states also pay private lawyers to represent the 
indigent clients. When the São Paulo state public defenders’ office was 
established, it took control over legal aid funding and recruitment of these 
supplementary private lawyers, putting it in conflict with the bar, which 
claimed it should be a mandatory intermediary in the recruitment 
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process.384 The bar ultimately lost that battle. As Fabio de Sa e Silva notes, 
“the clear goal of the bar in this conflict was to protect—and to some 
extent control—the market for legal services to the poor.”385 Thus, private 
lawyers essentially compete with the public defenders for funding.386 
Public defenders do not all belong to the OAB,387 and this, too, may 
account for why the OAB does not speak out for increased funding for 
public defenders’ offices.  
In other democratic countries, support by the organized bar for legal 
aid has emerged over time. In Israel, when the IBA Act passed in 1961, 
there was little discussion of lawyers having any duties to ensure equal 
access to justice.388 When the government established a public defenders’ 
office for criminal defense in 1995, the bar’s response was “ambiguous”—
expressing concern that many criminal defendants lacked representation, 
but anxious about the entry of state-funded lawyers in a field dominated 
by the private bar.389 The IBA has not supported increased funding for the 
public defenders’ office and has resisted expansion of its role.390 It was not 
until the late 1990s that the IBA began to evince real concern about access 
to justice issues in the civil context.391 When the government proposed a 
ten percent cut in civil legal aid funding in 2003 and 2007, the IBA 
president objected, arguing that it would affect the quality of legal 
representation for clients because lawyers would not be willing to work for 
the reduced fees.392 Such cuts also affected the income of private lawyers 
who were providing much of the legal aid.  
Countries transitioning from socialist or communist government had 
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386 Juliana Dal Piva, When Justice Falls Short: Brazil Needs 10,000 More Public Defenders, 
UNIVISION NOTICIAS (Apr. 7, 2017), https://www.univision.com/noticias/criminalidad-y-
justicia/when-justice-falls-short-brazil-needs-10-000-more-public-defenders. 
387 In March 2018, the Superior Court decided that public defenders are not required to belong to 
the OAB. STJ Resp. 1.710.555; Pedro Canário, Defensores Publicos Não Precisam de Inscrição na 
OAB, Decide 2a Turma do STJ [Public Defenders Do Not Need to be Registered in the OAB, Decides 
2nd Class of STJ], CONSULTOR JURÍDICO (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.conjur.com.br/2018-mar-
01/defensores-publicos-nao-inscritos-oab-decide-stj. That case is still pending in the courts. 
388 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1637-38, 1646. 
389 Id. at 1659. Prior to that time, publicly funded criminal defense was provided by the private 
bar. Katvan et al., supra note 155. 
390 Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Legal Profession, supra note 257, at 19-
20. 
391 See Ziv, supra note 161, at 1659-61. 
392 Knesset Comm. for Constitution, Law and Justice, Transcript Number 6522, June 9, 2003; 
Knesset Comm. for Constitution, Law and Justice, Transcript No. 120, Jan. 23, 2007. In 2007, the IBA 
also advocated against cutting the funding for the Public Defender’s office. Protocol of Government 
Legis. Comm., Jan. 23, 2007 (Isr.). 
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some history of legal aid. During the Soviet regime, lawyers practiced in 
collectives (also known as “consultation offices”) and the government set 
the fees they could charge.393 Lawyers were required to handle certain 
types of cases (e.g., worker’s compensation, alimony) and some matters 
for classes of individuals (e.g., servicemen, the disabled) without 
charge.394 Fees might also be waived in other types of cases if the client 
could not afford them.395 In post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan, the constitution 
provides that all citizens have the right to legal aid without charge if they 
lack sufficient means to pay.396  Nevertheless, there is a shortage of legal 
aid lawyers in some areas and the pay is very low.397 The 2016 Law on 
State Guaranteed Legal Aid provides for legal aid for income-qualified 
individuals in criminal, civil, and administrative cases.398 The Ministry of 
Justice initiated the drafting of the law, but the Advokatura added a 
recommendation to increase funding for legal aid.399 Of course, since 
advocates would be paid from those funds, this recommendation also 
reflected lawyers’ self-interest. 
Likewise in 1981, the Qaddafi regime enacted legislation that 
mandated that all Libyan lawyers become salaried members of the 
Department of People’s Legal Defense.400 Even after the regime permitted 
lawyers to resume private practice, those who continued as “people’s 
lawyers” provided free representation to Libyans.401 After 2011, people’s 
lawyers—who receive different training than private lawyers402—
continued to provide free representation in criminal cases and in some 
civil and administrative cases.403 Only private lawyers belong to the LBA, 
which seemingly has not advocated for increased support for legal aid. 
 
 
393 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & V. M. SAVITSKI, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF THE USSR 43 
(1979); GEORGE DANA CAMERON, THE SOVIET LAWYER AND HIS SYSTEM 55 (1978). 
394 CAMERON, supra note 393, at 55-56. 
395 BASSIOUNI & SAVITSKI, supra note 393, at 43. 
396 CONST. OF KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, art. 40, ¶ 3. 
397 See ABA ROLI LPRI, supra note 181, at 46-47; ODIHR REPORT ON THE REGIONAL EXPERT 
ROUNDTABLE ON LEGAL AID IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN CENTRAL ASIA 17 (2013), 
https://www.osce.org/odihr/104375?download=true.  
398 ELIDA K. NOGOIBAEVA & SANIIA TOKTOGAZIEVA, FREE LEGAL AID IN THE KYRGYZ 
REPUBLIC: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN RENDERING LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOR 
VULNERABLE GROUPS 3 (2017). 
399 E-mail from Azamat Kerimbaev, ABA ROLI Country Director in Kyrgyzstan, to Leslie C. 
Levin (Feb. 14, 2018, 05 5:14 EDT) (on file with authors).  
400 Carlisle, supra note 193. 
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402 Carlisle, supra note 204, at 82. 
403 Nasser Algheitta, The Role of Criminal Defence Lawyers in the Administration of Justice in 
Libya: Challenges and Prospects, in SEARCHING FOR JUSTICE IN POST-GADDAFI LIBYA, supra note 
204, at 96.  
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Private lawyers often view people’s lawyers with suspicion because they 
enabled the Qaddafi government by representing defendants in the 
notoriously unfair People’s Courts.404 Practically speaking, Libya’s 
political instability makes it difficult for the courts in the country to 
function.405 Legal aid, to the extent it exists, appears to be provided by 
funding from donors outside of Libya.406 
In China, the impetus for a well-developed legal aid system has mainly 
come from the government. The government’s Five-Year Plan for 
National Economic and Social Development (2001-2005) made 
developing a legal aid system a goal.407 China’s 2003 regulations on Legal 
Aid state that the government has a duty to provide legal aid.408 
Government funding has increased in recent years, providing legal aid in 
criminal cases and in some civil and administrative matters by lawyers, 
public notaries, legal affairs workers, and others.409 Even though China 
still has unmet legal needs and uneven quality of representation,410 lawyer 
organizations have rarely sought to influence the law on this issue.411 This 
may be because the government has been active in working to expand 
legal aid,412 because the bar leadership does not want to be viewed as 
critical of the government, or because the lawyers’ organizations do not 
view this to be their responsibility.  
Addressing the access to justice problem presents challenges for the 
legal profession, because it pits some lawyers’ economic interests against 
the goal of helping litigants better navigate the legal system without a 
 
 
404 See Carlisle, supra note 193. In contrast, many private practitioners had refused to appear in 
the People’s Courts because of the abuses that occurred there. Id.  
405 Id. 
406 See, e.g., Lori Brumat, Libya: Meet Salah, Keeping Hope for Redress in the Absence of a 
State, Amid a Civil War, OMCT (Dec. 2015), http://www.omct.org/human-rights-
defenders/links/libya/2015/12/d23507/ (describing Libyan Network for Legal Aid). 
407 Legal Aid, CHINA LEGAL INFO. CTR., http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinalic/2017-
07/07/content_30036063.htm (last updated July 7, 2017). 
408 Id.; AARON HALEGUA, U.S.-ASIA L. INST., WHO WILL REPRESENT CHINA’S WORKERS? 
LAWYERS, LEGAL AID, AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF LEGAL RIGHTS 22 (2016), 
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770150399/Halegua%2C+Who+Will+Represent+China%27s+Workers%3F+%282016%29.pdf. 
409 HALEGUA, supra note 408, at 19; Allen C. Choate, Legal Aid in China app. I (Asia 
Foundation Working Paper Series, No. 12, 2000), 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan017813.pdf . 
410 HALEGUA, supra note 408, at 20-23, 28-29. 
411 One exception was that in 2006, ACLA issued an opinion calling upon provincial-level 
governments to provide legal aid to migrant workers. Id. at 35. 
412 For example, in February 2018 the vice Minister of Justice announced plans to expand legal 
aid so that it is available to all villagers. China to Build National Public Legal Service by 2020, CHINA 
LEGAL INFO. CTR. (Feb. 8, 2018), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/m/chinalic/2018-
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lawyer. Yet lawyer organizations also recognize that by not addressing 
access to justice, non-lawyers may be given greater latitude to represent 
parties in court and elsewhere. This tension helps explain some of the 
organized bars’ battles over pro bono. In the United States, a few bar 
organizations have proposed a pro bono requirement, but most lawyer 
organizations have opposed it.413 In Israel, division in the IBA arose over 
whether to establish even a voluntary pro bono program, with some 
members objecting due to concerns about unfair competition and its 
impact on lawyers’ livelihoods.414 The IBA eventually supported pro bono 
in 2002, and in 2009 it initiated legislation for the first time for the IBA—
but not individual lawyers—to provide free legal services to the poor.415  
The pro bono story in Brazil similarly reflects divisions in the bar. The 
corporate bar and legal elite supported the idea of pro bono service, 
because it reflected clients’ interests in corporate social responsibility, 
which was transmitted by international organizations, and also elite 
lawyers’ conceptions of their role in society.416 Yet other lawyers, 
including some who represented low-income clients, viewed pro bono 
practice as unfair competition for clients and pressured the OAB 
leadership to limit or prohibit it.417 The OAB in São Paulo became 
persuaded that pro bono could lead to unfair competition and adopted a 
rule that limited pro bono work to the giving of legal advice outside of 
court to non-profit organizations, but not to individuals who could not pay 
for legal services.418 It was only after the Federal Ministério Público held a 
public hearing about this bar regulation, signaling that he would litigate 
against it, that the OAB rewrote the pro bono rule so that pro bono legal 
service could be performed for needy individuals.419 
 
 
 
 
413 See Leslie C. Levin, Pro Bono and Low Bono in the Solo and Small Firm Context, in PRIVATE 
LAWYERS & THE PUBLIC INTEREST: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF PRO BONO IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
155, 158 (Robert Granfield & Lynn Mather eds., 2009); Scott Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 30-32 (2004). 
414 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1665; Ziv, supra note 233, at 1780; Ruth Sinai, Practicing Law as a 
Mission, HAARETZ, Dec. 13, 2001. Prior to that time, the IBA’s ethics code provided that lawyers must 
be paid for legal representation. See Sinai, supra. 
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 D. Acting to Advance Human Rights or to Address Other Issues 
Affecting Civil Society   
Besides their efforts to benefit themselves, their clients, or the judicial 
system, lawyer organizations also work to advance human rights or other 
ideological or political issues. The JFBA, for example, publicizes its 
positions on a wide range of issues, seeking to promote human rights or 
oppose government actions it views as illegitimate. For instance, in 2014 
the JFBA called on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s ruling coalition to 
withdraw legislation that would allow Japan’s self-defense forces to fight 
to protect allies even without a direct threat to Japan. The bar saw the 
legislation as contrary to Japan’s Constitution, which states: “the right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”420 The JFBA joined 
demonstrations and spoke out to oppose this legislation, which ultimately 
passed notwithstanding strong public opposition.421 The JFBA has also 
taken a stand on many human rights issues, such as capital punishment.422 
In addition, the JFBA has advocated on purely political issues, such as 
urging the government to withdraw from nuclear power generation in the 
wake of Japan’s 2011 nuclear disaster and seeking changes in the 
agreement with the United States concerning the presence of U.S. armed 
forces in Japan.423     
 
 
420 NIHONKOKU KENPŌ [KENPŌ] [CONSTITUTION], art. 9 (Japan); JFBA Opposes Right to 
Collective Self-Defense, Nuclear Power, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, May 30, 2014. 
421  Opinion Concerning the Cabinet’s Decision Approving the Exercise of the Right to 
Collective Self-Defense, etc., Japan Fed’n B. Ass’ns (Sept. 18, 2014), 
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/opinionpapers/20140918.html;  
64th JFBA General Meeting – Resolution Opposing the Approval of Exercising the Right to 
Collective Self-Defense, Japan Fed’n B. Ass’ns (May 31, 2013), 
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/130531.html; Agence France-Presse, Japan 
Lawyers Join Opposition to Controversial Security Bills, Defense News (Aug. 26, 2015), 
https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2015/08/26/japan-lawyers-join-opposition-to-
controversial-security-bills.  
422 Statement Protesting Execution of the Death Penalty and Reiterating Our Request for 
Suspension of Executions and the Launch of a Nationwide Debate on the Abolition of the Death 
Penalty, JAPAN FED’N B. ASS’NS (Sept. 12, 2013), 
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2013/130912.html; Statement on 
Executions of Death Penalty, JAPAN FED’N B. ASS’NS (Apr. 27, 2007), 
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2007/20070427.html; Elaine Lies, Japan 
Lawyer’s Group Seeks to End Death Penalty, REUTERS (Oct. 7, 2016), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-deathpenalty-idUSKCN127190. 
423 See Statement Calling for the Realization of Non-Nuclear Power Policies through the Early 
Establishment of the Basic Law on Non-Nuclear Power Plants, JAPAN FED’N B. ASS’NS (Sept. 21, 
2012), https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/document/statements/year/2012/120921.html; Opinion with 
Regard to the Status of Forces Agreement Between Japan and the U.S., JAPAN FED’N B. ASS’NS (Feb. 
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Like in Japan, the legal profession in Brazil views its role as a protector 
of civil liberties and human rights.424 By the mid-1970s, the OAB was 
fighting political repression precipitated by the 1964 military coup and it 
eventually played a significant role in the democratization of the 
country.425 The OAB has also involved itself in other human rights 
activities. Starting in 1980, the OAB formed Human Rights Commissions 
in its federal council and regional associations.426 It has spoken out on 
racial discrimination and in 2008, it asked the Supreme Court to exempt 
torture that occurred during the military regime from the Amnesty Law to 
allow prosecution of those responsible for killings.427 In 1992, the OAB’s 
president filed charges for high crimes against the then-President Collor de 
Mello, which led to his impeachment.428 The OAB also voted in 2016 to 
support the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and to add new 
impeachment charges of obstructing justice.429 This vote put the OAB 
squarely in the midst of political conflict and was controversial within the 
organization. Indeed, the smaller, voluntary IAB opined that it considered 
the impeachment of Rousseff to be unconstitutional.430   
In contrast to Japan and Brazil, the Israeli bar does not share a deep 
tradition of speaking out on social justice or other issues concerning civil 
society.431 During its first forty years, the IBA rarely became involved in 
public matters unrelated to the legal system or legal representation.432 In 
the 1990s, some IBA members formed a group within the IBA called 
Lishka Acheret (“A Different Bar”) that challenged the bar to speak out 
 
 
424 See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text; TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 115; Falcão, 
supra note 110, at 426.  
425 See, e.g., ALVES, supra note 116, at 149, 157, 161-62; Junqueira, supra note 116, at 163. 
426 TAYLOR, supra note 117, at 112; Falcão, supra note 110, at 426. 
427 Cecilia MacDowell Santos, Transnational Legal Activism and the State: Reflections on Case 
Against Brazil in the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 4 SUR. REVISTA INTERNACIONAL 
DE DIREITOS HUMANOS 29 (2007); Nina Schneider, Impunity in Post-authoritarian Brazil: The 
Supreme Court’s Recent Verdict on the Amnesty Law, 90 EUR. REV. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN STUD. 
39, 49 (2011). 
428 E-mail from Fabio de Sa e Silva, Professor of Brazilian Studies, University of Oklahoma, to 
Lynn Mather (Feb. 27, 2019, 11:33 EST) (on file with authors). Collor resigned just before the 
impeachment trial, but the Brazilian Senate held the trial and voted for impeachment. See Alexandra 
Rattinger, The Impeachment Process of Brazil: A Comparative Look at Impeachment in Brazil and the 
United States, 49 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 129, 149 (2018). 
429 Anthony Boadle, Brazil Lawyers File New Impeachment Case Against Rousseff, REUTERS 
(Mar. 28, 2016), http://reut.rs/1MOnFcP. 
430 Impeachment de Dilma é Inconstitucional, Diz Instituto dos Advogados do Brasil 
[Impeachment of Dilma is Unconstitutional, Says Brazilian Bar Association], CONSULTOR JURÍDICO 
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.conjur.com.br/2016-ago-05/iab-aprova-parecer-contrario-impeachment-
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against human rights abuses.433 In 1999, they helped elect an IBA 
president with a “left-liberal” agenda who demanded that the IBA take on 
position human rights issues in Israel and the West Bank.434 Thereafter, the 
IBA’s Human Rights Committee warned soldiers who were carrying out 
targeted assassinations of Palestinian militants and officers who ordered 
demolitions of houses owned by Palestinians that military personnel could 
be prosecuted for war crimes.435 It has also spoken out against gender 
discrimination in the military.436  
Bar associations in the United States have a mixed tradition of 
speaking out on human rights and rule of law issues, but for somewhat 
different reasons. As previously noted, mandatory U.S. bar associations 
are often unable to use bar dues to promote political positions.437 
Sometimes voluntary lawyer organizations also encounter difficulty 
speaking out on certain issues. When the ABA’s House of Delegates 
adopted a resolution in 1990 in favor of a woman’s right to an abortion, it 
faced strong dissent from its politically diverse membership, and 
ultimately retreated from that position.438 Yet the ABA was able to pass a 
resolution in 1997 calling for a moratorium on capital punishment until 
jurisdictions improved their sentencing policies and procedures. Critics of 
the resolution argued that, like abortion, this was a political matter, but 
advocates successfully argued that the issue of capital punishment directly 
related to the judicial system.439 The ABA also acted to influence the law 
concerning the “war on terrorism” by opposing the use of torture.440 Other 
voluntary bar organizations in the United States have also sought to 
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influence the law with respect to human rights and rule of law issues. 
Thus, the Massachusetts Bar Association has called for the end of the 
government policy that resulted in the separation of immigrant children 
from their parents at the U.S. border.441 The National Bar Association, 
composed of predominantly African-American attorneys and judges, has 
met with members of the legislative and executive branches to advance 
their agenda, including dismantling the system of mass incarceration.442 
Even in authoritarian regimes, lawyer organizations sometimes act 
collectively to influence human rights and the rule of law. In Libya, 
notwithstanding the Qaddafi regime’s significant control over lawyers, the 
Tripoli Bar Association attempted to take an active role in monitoring 
human rights.443 In 2008, it wrote a letter to authorities demanding the 
investigation of the kidnapping of lawyer Dhaw Al-Mansuri, president of 
the Center for Democracy, and in 2009, it established a fact-finding 
committee that requested access to Ain Zara prison.444 The Benghazi 
courthouse and the Benghazi Bar Association were “cradles of rebellion” 
in the final year of Qaddafi’s rule.445 Post Qaddafi, international 
organizations have worked with the LBA and other lawyer organizations 
to support the bar in its efforts to ensure free elections and advance human 
rights.446 Yet in Kyrgyzstan, where lawyer organizations remain relatively 
new, they have not been actively involved in human rights advocacy.447 
The mandatory Advokatura has focused primarily on internal issues.448  
 
 
441Massachusetts Bar Association President: End Border Policy that Separate Children from 
Parents, MASS. B. ASS’N NEWS (June 20, 2018), https://www.massbar.org/docs/default-source/press-
releases/2018/06-20-18-massbar-president---end-border-policy-that-separates-children-from-
parents.pdf?sfvrsn=8 (referring to policy as “inhumane” and “immoral”). 
442 Benjamin L. Crump, A Year in Review, NAT’L BAR ASS’N MAG., July 2016, at 20, 
https://gallery.mailchimp.com/b493e6c4d31beda32fdaf8e2d/files/FINAL_NBA_Magazine_2016.01.p
df.  
443 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, TRUTH AND JUSTICE CAN’T WAIT: HUMAN RIGHTS 
DEVELOPMENTS IN LIBYA AMID INSTITUTIONAL OBSTACLES 29 (2009), 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/libya1209webwcover.pdf.  
444  Id. at 29, 32. 
445 ILAC, supra note 91, at 61. Khalid al-Saji, the chairman of the LBA, was reportedly one of 
the fourteen men who launched the revolt. Clemens Hoges, A Courthouse in Benghazi: The Nerve 
Center of the Revolution, DER SPIEGEL (Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/a-
courthouse-in-benghazi-the-nerve-center-of-the-libyan-revolution-a-749227.html.  
446 See, e.g., Am. Bar Ass’n Rule of Law Initiative, Libyan Lawyers Prepare for Elections, July 
27, 2012 (on file with authors); Promoting Change Through Women’s Legal Network in Libya, supra 
note 208.  
447 They have, however, cooperated in providing workshops aimed at training human rights 
lawyers. See Empowering Young Lawyers in Kyrgyzstan Through Human Rights Training, UN HUM. 
RIGHTS OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R (Dec. 30, 2016), 
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In China, the bar associations rarely seek to influence the law relating 
to human rights issues, in part, due to state control. Nevertheless, in 2001, 
the Beijing Lawyers Association set up a Committee on Constitutional 
Law and Human Rights (CCLHR), and in 2004, ACLA created a similar 
committee.449 For a while, the CCLHR offered a platform for politically 
liberal lawyers to develop professional networks and in the mid-2000s, to 
become involved in rights defense cases.450 In 2007, the BLA effectively 
ended the “human rights” aspects of the CCLHR.451 Nevertheless, 
networks of activist lawyers in China have continued to advance a number 
of human rights issues including freedom of speech and religion.452 They 
have worked online with international lawyer organizations, UN advocacy 
groups, and NGOs to push for expanded human rights in China.453  
IV. WHEN AND WHY DO LAWYER 
ORGANIZATIONS ACT TO INFLUENCE LAW?   
Although only seven countries are examined here, the discussion 
provides some insights into collective lawyer activities to influence law. 
At the very least, lawyer organizations must have the ability to act on legal 
issues. Their ability, in turn, depends on their strength as organizations, 
something that organizational theories can help explain. Broadly speaking, 
their ability to act depends on the organization’s micro-level 
characteristics, relations between the lawyer organization and the state, 
and support for the profession from the international legal community.  
Characteristics of the lawyer organization constitute one important 
factor that affects organizations’ ability to influence law. New lawyer 
associations such as Kyrgyz’s Advokatura face questions of legitimacy—
even among its members—that likely inhibit any such efforts. New 
associations must also focus on establishing internal structures and rules 
before attempting lawmaking on issues unrelated to their own immediate 
interests. In contrast, older established bar associations such as in Brazil 
and the United States have a history of—and mechanisms for—working to 
influence the law. Such mechanisms include, for example, the OAB’s 
constitutional standing to file cases before Brazil’s Supreme Court, and the 
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449 Liu & Halliday, supra note 222, at 12-13. 
450 Id. at 13. 
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ABA’s Governmental Affairs Office in Washington, D.C., which conveys 
the ABA’s views to government entities.454 As voluntary lawyer 
associations become stronger and attract more members, they may also 
become more solvent, enabling them to hire staff (e.g., lobbyists, public 
relations personnel) to facilitate efforts to influence the law.455 
The membership composition of lawyer organizations also affects their 
ability to act. Organizations with lawyers from different practice settings 
or political ideologies tend to disagree about preferred directions of legal 
change and whether to take action at all. When lawyer organizations fail to 
act, new organizations may emerge. In the United States, when elite bar 
associations failed to represent the interests of non-elite members, new 
lawyer associations sprung up to fulfill those needs. Likewise, new 
organizations were established in Japan to work for political and social 
changes that some lawyers sought.  
The method of decision making within a lawyer organization also 
influences its ability to act. For instance, in China, the government-
selected bar leadership controls many of its decisions. In hierarchical 
lawyer organizations, bar leaders can act on behalf of the organization, 
allowing them some political space to advance their own values or 
ambitions. This can be seen in Brazil’s OAB, where decision making is 
consolidated within a fairly small group of leaders, and in Israel’s IBA, 
where its president can speak freely on many issues. In contrast, in lawyer 
organizations such as the ABA, which requires voting by the almost 600-
member House of Delegates, leaders have a more difficult time convincing 
members to act on law reform. This can sometimes be circumvented, 
however, by pronouncements by the ABA president, or actions by ABA 
committees, which do not require such approval.  
In addition, the relationship between lawyer organizations and the state 
reveals a good deal about lawyers’ collective ability to influence the law. 
Authoritarian governments, like China or Libya under Qaddafi, can limit 
lawyer organizations’ ability to operate autonomously, especially on 
matters that threaten state interests. Efforts within such organizations by 
rank and file lawyers to affect the law—or even to achieve self-
governance of the organizations—can be readily thwarted and even 
dangerous.  
Even in democracies, laws governing lawyer organizations can limit or 
facilitate their ability to act to influence the law.456 In Israel, lawyers 
 
 
454 See supra note 128 and accompanying text; Advocacy & Initiatives, supra note 105. 
455 See HALLIDAY, supra note 78, at 290, 304. 
456 Government policy can also constrain lawyer organizations from acting. For example, the 
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cannot form other bar associations, thus presenting obstacles for lawyers 
with different views from IBA leadership from acting collectively. In the 
United States, mandatory state bars are constrained in their ability to 
engage in advocacy for political or ideological purposes. Yet in Brazil, the 
OAB has legal standing to directly challenge state actions it views as 
unconstitutional, making it easier for that association to act on a wide 
range of subjects. 
The emergence of international actors and transnational legal orders 
changes relations between organizations and the state. For the legal 
profession in particular, a growing global legal community focused on rule 
of law and human rights issues has empowered lawyer organizations in 
many countries, sometimes allowing them to counter state power. When 
working with lawyer organizations, groups such as the International Bar 
Association and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe transmit 
international standards contained in the U.N Basic Principles on the Role 
of Lawyers and the European Parliament’s Resolution on the Legal 
Professions.457 Global lawyer organizations also provide support to 
informal lawyer networks in their attempts to influence law in China and 
elsewhere. In Libya, immediately after the fall of Qaddafi, the organized 
bar received assistance from ABA ROLI in its work on legislation that 
restored the bar’s autonomy. ABA ROLI also helped advocates in 
Kyrgyzstan with the law establishing the Advokatura.  
Even when lawyer associations are able to attempt to influence law, 
other factors affect why they do so. Consider the many different activities 
of the lawyer organizations in these seven countries. Why the 
organizations acted—or why they did not—can be explained by elements 
of organization theory as applied to the legal profession. 
Viewing lawyer groups as rational, self-interested actors provides one 
important lens for understanding why lawyer organizations act. That is, 
they act to advance their professional power and status through efforts to 
preserve lawyers’ autonomy, define and expand the legal market, and 
protect themselves from attack. In Israel and many U.S. jurisdictions, 
lawyers also sought compulsory bar membership to enable them to 
 
 
ABA was constrained from directly participating in efforts to draft a code of conduct for the 
International Criminal Court because the United States had not ratified the treaty establishing the 
court. See Levin, Mather & de Groot-van Leeuwen, supra note 18, at 454. 
457 These standards emphasize the importance of lawyer independence and advance the view that 
lawyers have a crucial role to play in promoting justice and guaranteeing respect for human rights. See 
U.N. Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers, supra note 14, at arts. 4, 14, 16, 23-24; Resolution on 
the Legal Professions and the General Interest in the Functioning of Legal Systems, EUR. PARL. DOC. 
P6_TA(2006)0108, pts. A, D, E, K(4) (2006).  
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advocate more effectively for the profession.458 Organizations lobbied 
against expansion of the size of the bar in Israel, Japan, and Brazil, and for 
restrictions on foreign lawyers. The frequency of lobbying by lawyer 
organizations to protect lawyers from competition also supports theories of 
organizational maintenance. When successful, such lobbying brings 
material benefits to their members and also strengthens the organizations.  
When lawyer organizations work on law to benefit their clients, they 
may also benefit lawyers themselves—for example, by making their work 
easier, expanding the pool of clients, or making their work more 
remunerative. Examples from the commercial context in China, Israel, and 
the United States show bar associations attempting to influence the law in 
order to provide benefits for their corporate clients. Likewise, lawyer 
organizations in Brazil, Israel, Japan and the United States opposed anti-
money laundering regulation that would force lawyers to disclose client 
information. Yet, new institutionalist explanations also apply here since 
such lobbying may reflect the shared norms and ways of seeing the world 
of corporate lawyers and their corporate clients.459 Or, to take an example 
from specialty bars in the United States, when plaintiffs’ lawyers, 
immigration lawyers or criminal defense bars work on law reform, they 
can be understood as pursuing shared ideological goals when they seek to 
advance their clients’ causes. In other words, mutual ideals—rooted in 
institutional culture—and not only self-interest, may explain the actions of 
lawyer organizations. Indeed, such efforts to advance clients’ interests 
may entail costs for lawyers. Attempts by networks of criminal defense 
lawyers in China to expose rights violations by state officials would 
benefit their clients. But such advocacy also came at great personal cost to 
the lawyers as they risked arrest or loss of their licenses for their actions. 
Lawyer organizations in all seven countries devoted energy to issues 
directly affecting the courts and the administration of justice. This third 
category can also be explained, in part, by the shared cultural and political 
values of lawyers in their institutional sector, which permeate individual 
organizations. That is, political liberalism motivates lawyers in some 
countries to work collectively for due process and the rule of law, and to 
oppose an authoritarian state and a weak judiciary. In Kyrgyzstan, where 
 
 
458 See, e.g., DAYTON D. MCKEAN, THE INTEGRATED BAR 41, 45 (1963); Gallagher, supra note 
232, at 522-25 (providing examples of lawyers asking the courts to form mandatory U.S. state bar 
associations); E-mail from Limor Zer-Gutman, Lecturer, Haim Striks School of Law, to Leslie C. 
Levin (Feb. 23, 2019, 16:33 EST) (on file with authors). 
459 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (suggesting that corporate lawyers and clients 
have similar normative views due to their shared institutional culture).  
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lawyer organizations view the courts as corrupt or lacking legitimacy, they 
sometimes act through projects designed to increase the independence and 
integrity of the judiciary.460 Even where courts are stronger institutions, 
lawyer organizations may oppose the courts if the courts’ actions are seen 
as threatening the rule of law. Thus, in Israel, the IBA opposed the 
Supreme Court when it believed the court was exceeding its institutional 
power and acting on political questions.  In Brazil and Japan, lawyer 
associations spoke out when they believed the courts were not acting 
expeditiously or fairly. 
In democratic countries, such as Brazil, Israel, Japan, and the United 
States, lawyer organizations have worked to strengthen the courts and to 
defend the judiciary when it was under attack. Selfless reasons alone do 
not explain such organizational actions. Since lawyers’ legitimacy and 
importance often depend upon the courts’ legitimacy, lawyer organizations 
have a vested interest in maintaining the independence and integrity of the 
judiciary. In addition, in countries like the United States, the courts often 
protect lawyers from extensive legislative regulation,461 so ensuring the 
independence of the courts from the other political branches serves 
lawyers’ interests as well.  
Conflicts sometimes arise, however, between lawyers’ self-interests 
and their interest in improving courts and the administration of justice. 
This can be seen in some efforts to expand access to justice, which 
promotes the rule of law and improves the administration of justice. 
Lawyer organizations lobbied to expand government funding for legal 
services in Japan and the United States, which would increase access to 
justice and presumably, fees paid to legal aid lawyers. But lawyer 
associations in Brazil and Israel were divided over lawyers engaged in pro 
bono due, in part, to concerns about their economic self-interest in being 
paid for their work. These examples underscore how conflict over what 
constitutes an organization’s “self-interest” in a heterogeneous lawyer 
organization complicates its decision to work for or against legal change.  
Finally, the importance of the norms and values of political liberalism, 
with lawyers working to curb state power and promote a moderate state, 
was shown through actions by lawyer associations in Brazil, Japan, Libya, 
and the United States to promote human rights, defend political prisoners, 
 
 
460 See supra notes 348-49 and accompanying text. Of course, in some cases, advocates may not 
be motivated by political liberalism, but may simply wish to spare their clients the cost of paying 
bribes or may prefer to work in a system in which corruption is less pervasive. 
461 BARTON H. BARTON, THE LAWYER-JUDGE BIAS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 113, 115-
20 (2011).  
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and support persecuted minorities. When lawyers conceive of their 
professional role in society as important for moderating the state and 
historically have done so, they sometimes act to influence law for that 
purpose. Thus, as previously noted, Japan’s lawyer organizations have a 
long-standing commitment to social justice and a history of opposition to 
the state, which includes active pursuit of civil rights and human rights 
agendas. Similarly, in Brazil, the OAB views itself as a defender of 
democratic values. The history of both organizations has empowered them 
to engage with wide-ranging political issues that are removed from 
concerns about lawyers or the judiciary, such as the JFBA’s opposition to 
nuclear power and the OAB’s votes for presidential impeachment.  
As historic institutionalism would suggest, the history of other lawyer 
organizations makes them more reluctant to speak out on political issues. 
In Israel, when the Knesset debated the act creating the IBA in 1961, most 
of the discussions “rested upon an assumption that the bar does not carry 
strong societal or other collective commitments.”462 This shared 
assumption “imprinted” the organization so that until the early 2000s, the 
IBA focused its efforts to influence the law primarily on issues affecting 
the interests of lawyers, clients, and the legal system, narrowly defined. In 
China, lawyers operate within a society that shares an altogether different 
conception of the state and the individual rooted in traditional attitudes 
about the importance of social harmony and reinforced by communist 
ideology. It is not just that there is little history of opposition to the state, 
but rather, it is contrary to societal values to do so.  
Even when lawyer organizations prefer to avoid political engagement, 
however, cause lawyers may be able to “push” them to take action, 
especially during periods of political conflict or crisis.463 Cause lawyers in 
the United States, for example, were able to move the ABA to call for a 
moratorium on the hotly contested issue of the death penalty.464 In Israel in 
the 1990s, some IBA members eventually moved the bar to speak out 
against human rights abuses involving Israeli security forces and Israel’s 
military.465 In China, activist lawyers were eventually able to force ACLA 
and the Guangxi Provincial Lawyers Association to express support for 
accused lawyers who had been detained in Beihai.  
 
 
462 Ziv, supra note 166, at 62.  
463 ECON. & SOC. RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EFECTIVENESS OF BAR ASSOCIATIONS IN CONFLICT 
& CRISIS 25 (Dec. 2016), https://lawyersconflictandtransition.org/themainevent/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/THE-EFFECTIVENESS-OF-BAR-ASSOCIATIONS-IN-CONFLICT-AND-
CRISIS.pdf. See also McEvoy & Rebouche, supra note 50, at 276. 
464 See Sarat, supra note 439, at 189-90, 196-201, 204-05. 
465 Ziv, supra note 161, at 1663. 
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Lawyer organizations, like all organizations, make compromises not 
only to satisfy members with diverging views, but also to negotiate their 
relationship with the state and institutional actors. As organizational 
theories suggest, rational organizational leaders might lobby government 
for benefits for their membership, but at the same time they must be 
concerned with organizational survival. Since groups operate in 
competition with others, according to environmental ecology theory, the 
need for organizational survival might mean foregoing efforts to influence 
the law in order to garner support from other interest groups or 
institutions. The IBA, for example, has supported Israel’s Ministry of 
Justice in the selection of right-leaning judges in apparent exchange for 
protection of the IBA’s right to self-regulate.466 The ABA eventually 
modified its confidentiality rules to align with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s efforts to regulate lawyer conduct to maintain its influence 
in the realm of lawyer regulation.467  
Yet even where lawyer organizations historically have worked to 
promote political liberalism, there may be times when they will not do so. 
Halliday, Karpik and Feeley argue that the “legal complex” mobilizes 
selectively for legal freedom.468 They identify two instances where the 
legal complex will not act despite a history of commitment to political 
liberalism (observations that seemingly also apply to lawyer 
organizations). One is when a “singular moment punctuates an otherwise 
liberal record” or what historical institutionalists call a “critical 
moment.”469 An example would be when the United States was gripped by 
fear of Communism in the 1950s and the ABA did little to oppose 
McCarthyism.470 A second instance of inaction by the legal complex is 
 
 
466 See Hazards Inherent in the Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Legal Profession, supra note 257, at 
22-25; Yonah Jeremy Bob, Will Israel Bar Association President Allegations End Shaked’s 
Revolution?, JERUSALEM POST (Dec. 26, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Will-Israel-Bar-
Association-president-allegations-end-Shakeds-revolution-575500; Yonah Jeremy Bob, Shaked, Hayut 
Battle Over Future of High Court, JERUSALEM POST (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-
News/Shaked-Hayut-battle-over-future-of-High-Court-543206. 
467 See, e.g., Michael Ariens, “Playing Chicken”: An Instant History of the Battle Over 
Exceptions to Client Confidences, 33 J. LEGAL PROF. 239, 279-81 (2009); Roger C. Cramton et al., 
Legal and Ethical Duties of Lawyers After Sarbanes-Oxley, 49 VILL. L. REV. 725, 728-33 (2004). 
468 Halliday, Karpik, and Feeley use the term “legal complex” to mean “the system of relations 
among legally trained occupations which mobilize on a particular issue.” See Halliday et al., supra 
note 86, at 6-7. This may include, for example, lawyers, judges, prosecutors, legal academics, and 
others depending upon the country and the issue. 
469 Id. at 25. 
470 JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN 
AMERICA 238-39 (1976). In fact, the ABA recommended that lawyers attest to their anti-Communist 
loyalty by being required to take an anti-Communist oath. Id. at 239-40 Not all U.S. bar associations 
supported McCarthy’s investigations. See, e.g., GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTS: THE 
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where an “enduring threat inhibits a legal complex from extending its 
habitual liberalism to every issue.”471 This can be seen in the reluctance of 
the Israeli bar to speak out forcefully on the rights of Palestinians and on 
national security issues.472 In that case, the perceived threat to the security 
of the state allowed government leaders to supersede legal protections.  
As the preceding discussion suggests, environmental forces on 
organizations play a large role in why organizations act (or fail to act), 
suggesting the importance of asking: What is the historical role of lawyer 
organizations with respect to the state? What is lawyers’ collective 
understanding of their role? That is, how do lawyers see their role as legal 
professionals in these countries? Whose interests are they representing—
the government’s? The public’s? Their clients’? Their own? Does the 
public mood provide political space for action or are security threats 
perceived to be too grave? Lawyer organizations operate in a wider 
institutional and organizational setting, and this embeddedness affects 
their actions. Where do allies or opponents of the organization stand on an 
issue? Are lawyers within the organization acting to push particular 
causes, or are global lawyer organizations encouraging action? 
Even when lawyer organizations lobby on an issue, there may be 
multiple reasons behind it. That is to say, internal organizational politics 
also explain group efforts. Lawyer associations are comprised of many 
members and the activities of the leaders may not reflect the priorities or 
views of the rank and file. Likewise, committee actions and statements can 
be at odds with others within the same lawyer organization. In addition, 
when seeking to influence law, lawyer organizations—like any other 
political actor—use public interest rhetoric to justify positions that internal 
deliberations reveal to be based on self-interest.  
CONCLUSION 
This attempt to map the terrain is limited in several respects, including 
that it focuses mostly on the largest lawyer organizations in seven 
countries and does not provide a fine-grained account of their internal 
deliberations. In addition, this study only reviews efforts by lawyer 
organizations to influence law over the last few decades. The picture might 
look quite different in ten years. For instance, as Kyrgyz’s new 
Advokatura becomes more established, it may be able to look beyond 
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advocates’ interests to engage in additional lawmaking efforts. This will 
depend, in part, on internal politics in Kyrgyzstan, and whether advocates’ 
conceptions of their role in society changes from the views prevalent in 
the Soviet period to those that align with international standards. Likewise, 
if the political situation in Libya proceeds in a democratic direction, the 
LBA may be able to act in additional ways to strengthen government 
institutions and to otherwise influence the law. Alternatively, in the future 
it may become much more difficult for lawyer organizations to act, with 
reactionary or authoritarian powers reasserting control as they have 
recently done in Hungary and Turkey. The internet and international 
lawyer organizations will no doubt continue to disseminate norms and 
values, and empower—or limit—lawyer organizations in ways they have 
not yet imagined.  
Further research on these lawyer organizations, other lawyer 
organizations in the countries (where applicable), and how they operate in 
their political environment is needed. Case studies of lawyer organizations 
in additional countries will also help us better understand when and why 
lawyer organizations act (or do not act) to influence the law. Moreover, the 
account of lawmaking efforts by lawyer organizations reported here 
suggests other important questions for research. How do lawyer 
organizations seek to influence law? As lawyers, do they tend toward 
strategies not typically used by other organizations because of their access 
to judges and government officials, or do they act like other organizations 
with respect to lobbying? How does a country’s history affect its lawyer 
organizations vis-à-vis attempts to influence the law? In which countries 
have the global influences on lawyer organizations been most (and least) 
pronounced, and why? And the obvious next question: how successful are 
lawyer organizations in their efforts to influence law?  
Lawyer organizations operated as guilds centuries ago to protect their 
livelihoods and increase their power. Describing (and decrying) bar 
insistence on self-regulation and mandatory membership in the United 
States, J.A.C. Grant observed, “the guild has returned. Its purposes are the 
same as in the Middle Ages.”473 Today we still see substantial effort 
devoted to protecting lawyers’ independence, status, and monopoly on 
legal services. Yet, there are also numerous examples of lawyer 
organizations acting to defend the courts, improve the administration of 
justice, and secure access to justice. Significant efforts have also been 
made by lawyer organizations in some countries to advance human rights 
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and improve civil society, though these are less common. Under what 
circumstances will lawyer organizations act to influence the law beyond 
the guild’s interests? This study begins to answer that question. 
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